

UNEQUAL DEMOCRACIES:
ECONOMIC SANCTIONS' IMPACT ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN
DEMOCRATIC SYSTEMS

BY

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THESIS

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ABSTRACT

In the past, research into the field of human rights has treated regime as a dichotomous variable and divided the type of governmental structure into either autocracies or democracies. By lumping all democracies into one category, all variation between different categories of governmental composition is discarded and it is difficult to examine the differences between types of democratic governments and their human rights capacities. Due to their tendency to accrete power centrally, presidential democracies are thought to repress the rights of citizens more often and severely than parliamentary systems. Further, an exogenous shock to the political system, such as the threat or the imposition of an economic sanction is expected to act as a catalyst for repression. Using three different datasets of indicators of physical integrity human rights from a global sample over the years of 1976-1990 for two datasets and 1981-1990 for another, democracies are indeed shown to differ in their propensity to violate human rights. The effect of economic sanctions is negligible and is only significant in one model.

To my mama, Joan Partin, who never stopped believing in me, even when I did
not believe in myself. This is for you.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CIRI	Cingranelli-Richards Index
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
UDHR	Universal Declaration of Human Rights
UNIDIR	United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Research into the topic of human rights has typically focused on the differences between autocratic regimes and democratic states. In that tradition, the common wisdom holds that it is autocracies are more apt to foster human rights violations than democracies. While democracy's superior human rights record in comparison to autocracies has been historically exhibited in prolific amounts of research, dichotomizing the governmental system of a state tosses away a tremendous amount of variation. Democracy, no matter the compositional structure or characteristics, are homogenized into a single category. Because democracies are codified into a single category, it is impossible to parse out the distinctive outcomes associated with parliamentary or presidential democracies. As American influence expanded outward after the conclusion of the Second World War, establishing similar democratically governed states in the developing world rose to a prominent foreign policy goal.¹ In working to foster democracy, little attention was paid to the compositional design of democratic governments. What mattered most is that they were democratic. This thesis shows that there is a fundamental difference between democratic systems, which have implications for the human well-being of citizens within these states. Not all democracies are

1. John. Martinussen, *State, Society, and Market: A Guide to Competing Theories of Development* (New York: Zed Books, 1997), 34-35.

created equal. Due to the diffuse nature of policy-making power, parliamentary democracies are less likely to repress their populations. Following that argument, presidential democracies, because power is centralized in one figure, and often because of their military heritage are more prone to engage in human rights abuses. Initial decisions in how a democratic state should be organized and how power is to be distributed carry significant weight. This work seeks to address that gap in the literature and further explore the differences that exist between presidential and parliamentary governments in one of the most fundamental aspects of their “democraticness,” their respect for the human rights of their citizenry.

On a Mission to Forge Democracy Around the Globe

After the terroristic attacks perpetrated on September 11, 2001 against the United States, American forces quickly suppressed and contained the influence of Al Qaeda in Afghanistan. Almost immediately, the eyes of American leadership turned to Iraq. Within months, military forces from the United States were deployed into the nation and the political regime of Saddam Hussein quickly fell. In political discussions, the precise and full motivation for the invasion of Iraq in 2003 has been vehemently debated. On the eve of commencement of American operations in Iraq, President George W. Bush delivered a radio address to the nation where he explained a multi-faceted reasoning for its engagement in the region. On March 22, 2003 President George W. Bush stated, “Our cause is just,

the security of the nations we serve and the peace of the world. And our mission is clear, to disarm Iraq of weapons of mass destruction, to end Saddam Hussein's support for terrorism, and to free the Iraqi people.”² The motivation that the goal, arguably the final goal, of the operation is to free the Iraqi people is illuminating. Freedom, namely the freedom of self-governance via democracy was a goal of the American involvement in Iraq. In the Iraqi campaign, two distinct inputs of American foreign policy were intertwined: human rights and democratic proliferation. More striking, rather than being seen as completely separate ideas, democracy and variations of human rights are often seen as complimentary, albeit potentially endogenous, concepts. In that regard, democracies are perceived as bastions of human rights recognition and respect and the foreign policies of many of the world’s political power is to see that democracies are proliferated around the globe with autocracies transitioning into democratic states.

President Bush, in the same radio address, articulated the message to both Americans and Iraqis that:

In this conflict, American and coalition forces face enemies who have no regard for the conventions of war or rules of morality. Iraqi officials have placed troops and equipment in civilian areas, attempting to use innocent men, women and children as shields for the dictator's army. I want Americans and all the world to know that coalition forces will make every effort to spare innocent civilians from harm.³

2. George W. Bush, “President Discusses Beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom,” The White House, accessed December 23, 2017, <https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030322.html>.

3. Ibid.

The message is clear. America, a democracy, will attempt to respect the physical integrity rights of the Iraqi people, even while the authoritarian regime of Saddam Hussein blatantly disregards the human rights of his citizenry. By connecting the two statements, a promise that a democratic future for Iraq will also be a future composed of more protection for human rights of the people of Iraq was laid out as an American foreign policy goal. By toppling and removing a sadistic authoritarian leader and allowing the people of Iraq to govern themselves, Americans believed that democracy would take root and flourish. Ideally, the trend would continue through the rest of the Middle East, bringing in a period of grassroots democratization to the region which has traditionally been dominated by militaristic or religiously based authoritarian systems.

America has long pursued a mission of democratization around the globe. Although other political factors accounted for the motivation for American intervention into international affairs, democratization and preserving democracy has, at a minimum, often been cited as an influence toward heightened involvement abroad. When the United States, and the world community aggregately, have worked to build a democracy from the ashes of a fallen authoritarian nation the end goal is only democracy rather than considering the full scope of how the institutions will coalesce. Democracy is too often viewed as monolithic by policy makers and scholars alike. Although the differences between democratic structures are understood, the end result of democratic

features (i.e. equality before the law, right to representation and preservation of human and private property rights to list a few) are perceived as relatively equivalent between all types of democracy. For example, in the wake of the Second World War, the dominant goal of the United States was to contain Soviet influence and the spread of communism. One of the main ways that this was accomplished was by attempting to foster democracy, where possible. In the Republic of South Korea, for instance, any democratic regime, even if it was not ideal by democratic and human rights standard in the purest sense was viewed as an advantageous region for American influence.⁴

By considering regimes through a dichotomous lens of authoritarian or democratic there is considerable variation that is being ignored. Considering the theoretical and political implications of democracy building at the present and in the future, it is a spurious assumption to maintain that all democratic variants are ultimately the same with only superficial differences in their institutions and the structure of their compositions. If there are ultimately differences in the political governance between different variations of democracies then the questions of how those variations manifest themselves and what are the potential catalysts that lead to differences should be theoretically and empirically assessed.

4. Lee Hyun-hee, Park Sung-soo and Yoon Nae-hyun, *New History of Korea* (Gyeonggi-do, Korea: Jimoondang, 2005), 584-586.

This thesis will commence with an overview of three branches of research beginning with inspection of human rights. Conceptually, human rights are a broad topic and encapsulates a wide array of different attributions. Having evolved over time, the definition of what is specifically a human right is often debated. Physical protections against state violence or force are solidly entrenched in the literature. Second, this work will move to the topic of economic sanctions. Considering coercion of foreign actors, economic sanctions represent a moderate choice between talk, which is cheap, and military engagement, which is costly and risky. With respect to diplomacy and disputes amongst democratic states, sanctioning represents a more severe signal of the resolve of the sender and simultaneously sends a domestic signal to the population of the recipient nation about the policies of the leadership. Finally, this analysis will address the dynamics and features of democracies. Although they are often homogenized into a singular concept, the nuance of democracy type is fundamentally important. Organizationally, this order seems appropriate. Through explaining what is meant by human rights, it is easier to explain certain features of democratic states and their requisites. Further, as stated at the onset of this chapter, democracies are both peaceful with one another and more apt to fight wars that they are certain they will win.⁵ Economic sanctions are often a tool of coercion for democracies, against autocracies and other democracies. In this regard, the framework of this

5. Dan Reiter and Allan C. Stam, *Democracies at War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), 9.

thesis builds conceptually, from human rights toward democracies. Each concept helps in understanding others.

In addressing the topical question of how and why economic sanctions impact human rights negatively in presidential systems over their parliamentary counterparts, this thesis utilizes a statistical analysis with an overall timeframe of 27 years ranging from 1981 through 2008. This period offers a range of international cut points including the Cold War, the intermediate period following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent post September 11th War on Terrorism. Each of these time periods are unique, thereby limiting the influence of unique historical conditions upon the results that are obtained (e.g. the bipolarity of the Cold War period). After exhibiting the differences between democratic variations, this thesis will conclude with the implications from the findings and the consequences that not all democracies are created equal. Distinction in democratic institutions contain significant gravity and bear consequences for American and international foreign policy. Ultimately, it is not enough to work to just build democracy. Just as there has been a push in policy to implement so called “smart sanctions” there must also be an adjustment to work for “smart democracies” that represent the citizenry and protect their fundamental human rights in their own domestic policy.

Considering the words of President George W. Bush at the onset of the invasion of Iraq in 2003, protection of human rights in Iraq was an American

goal. The Americans promised to do all in their power to mitigate the danger to Iraqi citizens and, likewise, it was proposed that once democracy had been installed that human rights protections would also be formalized. Democracy, is conceptually tied to the protection of human rights. There is no scholarly debate that democracies are more conducive to human rights protections than their autocratic counterparts. Consideration of that subject would be retracing well-travelled theoretical and empirical ground. Further, there is the seemingly apodictic principle within the international relations sub-field encapsulated within the democratic peace theory that democracies do not engage in war with one another. Further, democracies are typically picky about the military engagements in which they involve themselves. Democracies are apt to only fight those wars in which they are likely to win.⁶ Although peaceful with one another militarily, democracies do disagree, often intensely. Because democracies are not likely to fight militarily, disagreements often take other forms, namely economic. As such, economic sanctions operate as an exogenous shock to the democratic system and are often some of the most severe threats that the nation will experience. Likewise, events of economic sanctioning and coercion are far more numerous than threats of military force and provide a larger numerical set for analysis and interpretation.

6. Reiter and Stam, 9.

This work seeks to address the differences between democracies and simultaneously add to the understanding on the efficacy of sanctions and of human rights recognition. It is a daunting task to attempt to intersect three distinct concepts from different subfields of political research. By synthesizing each of these concepts a richer and more robust understanding of each and the world as a whole can be achieved.

This thesis, analyzes the outcome and later generational consequences of both international and foreign policy.⁷ Domestic choices, such as how leaders determine to establish their government, have international consequences. Likewise, foreign policy choices, such as the United States advocating for democracy or intervening to topple an autocrat, have domestic ramifications for the target nation. Therefore, the choice of a state to implement an economic sanction, a moderate form of international economic coercion, has the potential to create human externalities if the domestic conditions are appropriate.

It is important to remember that each of these concepts does not exist and operate in a vacuum. Politically, the choices and outcomes of decisions spread outward, influencing and affecting other concepts and fields. Robert Putnam, in analyzing diplomatic negotiations between states, articulated that negotiations operate within two different, yet connected fields. Actors deal with other actors

7. Thomas Sowell, *Applied Economics: Thinking Beyond Stage One* (New York: Basic 2009), 2-4.

on both the international sphere and the domestic sphere. What happens on one level impacts the other level.⁸ Putnam's principle of two-level analysis is appropriate when discussing economic sanctions, human rights, and democratic regime construction. Each of these variables influences and affects the other, both on the international and the domestic level. Within politics, there are fundamental connections of concepts that have been unexplored. This research provides insight into each of these subjects and elucidates the connections between them. By attempting to tie three distinct concepts together, the fabric of the reality of the political spectrum can be more deeply elucidated.

8. Robert Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games," *International Organization*, 42 (1988).

CHAPTER TWO
THE HUMAN CONDITION: HUMAN RIGHTS IN THEORY AND
PRACTICE

Introduction

Human rights as a field of research has gained significant traction in recent decades. Scholarly debate has characterized practically every aspect of investigations into human rights. Basic foundations of research such as conceptualization and measurement have been hotly debated by many scholars. Debate is warranted, as conceptualization and measurement of human rights are essential for scientific study. Beyond issues of measurement and conception, a plethora of theoretical explanations of the specific conditions that influence different aspects of human rights occupy a position within the literature. The amount of debate and discourse that characterizes human rights is evidence to the fact that this sphere of political science is still developing and is still formulating conceptually, theoretically, and empirically.

This chapter will commence with a brief historical assessment of the development of human rights in theory and in practice. Second, an assessment will be conducted on the issue of conceptualization, and subsequently, the measurement of human rights. Third, it is essential to examine the impact of globalization upon human rights abuses and recognition. As the world becomes increasingly globalized, it simultaneously becomes a smaller place. As such, it is

more difficult to hide abuses of any severity from the world community. Today, one person with a cell phone can alert the entire world to repression occurring within a country. Fourth, moving forward from conceptualization, the impact of human rights on American foreign policy can be analyzed. This is fundamentally important for the purpose of this thesis, because economic sanctions represent a relatively inexpensive but also a strong signal to recipients and other actors in the system. Finally, it is necessary to consider the ramifications of human rights policy on sovereignty rights. Protecting human rights is a major component of American policy and international law. In attempting to enforce human rights, the overlap between physical integrity rights and state sovereignty is blurred.

Human Rights Throughout Human History

The focus of this section is to analyze the historical development of the conceptualization of human rights and, therefore, attempt to gain a more nuanced understanding of what is entailed within the trajectory of human rights. With the passage of time, human rights have evolved significantly in both scope and in the implications of policy that are associated with them. By considering the historical and philosophical evolution of human rights as a field and as a concept, which can be quantified and studied, it will be possible to assess the impact of economic sanctions on the quantifiable level of human rights within a democratic system. First, human rights in antiquity will be addressed. Second, the trajectory will be traced to the Reformation and Enlightenment period in Europe where it

influenced the young United States and its founders. Third, and finally, the modern interpretation of human rights in the post-World War II period will be briefly assessed.

Although many scholars posit that human rights is a fairly modern development in the realm of political science and policy studies, the roots of this field date back to antiquity. In ancient Mesopotamia, Hammurabi codified the laws of his Babylonian kingdom nearly 3,000 years ago to form the Code of Hammurabi. This code, while simultaneously depicting the king as a deity, established basic protections for citizens including penalties for committing violence against others. Further, it also established what might be understood today as a minimum wage for work.⁹ Therefore, the Code of Hammurabi influenced multiple aspects of the human existence and condition, and its impact as a legal code has extended down through history to the current day. Despite the protections in certain areas of physical integrity and for economic rights, there were still distinctions made between wealthy elites and poor laborers and also between men and women in their rights and protections. In that respect, while there were human rights incorporated into the code, they were hardly universal, but rather subjective in the populations and groups which they served based upon the circumstances.¹⁰ Although this code was flawed in many ways, it did provide

9. Jean Bottéro, *The 'Code' of Hammurabi" in Mesopotamia: Writing, Reasoning and the Gods* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 165.

10. *Ibid.*, 167.

a governmental source for protection of multiple variations of human rights as they are understood today.

Moving forward in history to the Reformation period of Europe, the idea of the responsibility of man to one another and, more important, the duties of the state to its citizens became a fundamental source of investigation. There are many theorists that could be credited as a source of framing the idea of natural rights and many, lengthier, volumes have been written to explore this history. Much of the credit for this philosophical thinking can be credited to the Dutch jurist, Hugo Grotius. According to George Sabine in his interpretation of Grotius' view of natural law, "certain broad principles of justice are natural—that is natural and unchangeable—and upon these principles are erected the varying systems of municipal law, all depending upon the sanctity of covenants, and also international law, which depends upon the sanctity of covenants between rulers."¹¹ Ergo, by virtue of the simple fact that one is human, there are certain conditions of integrity that are deserved, and likewise, there are simultaneously specific expectations of action that govern the manner in which individuals act toward one another. Similarly, these covenants, as Sabine attributed the concept, exist between rulers and the governed. Because rulers represent the state, and in many cases, they are the embodiment of the state and its capacity, they are subject

11. George H. Sabine, *A History of Political Theory*, (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1953), 424.

to the same moral and natural laws that govern the interactions between individuals as it pertains to basic human freedoms. Figures such as Hugo Grotius served as a philosophical foundation on which to build and expand the conceptual definitions of human rights. Political philosophers during the enlightenment and beyond grappled with the issue of state respect for individual rights and precisely how these protections should be made manifest in the public realm via political policy. The legacy of Hugo Grotius was passed down to influential thinkers such as John Locke, who, in turn, had a massive impact upon the American framers of the Constitution. Innate rights which are possessed by all individuals was a foundational base for Locke and is reflected as well in the American founders' writing, although there were still areas in which human integrity suffered.¹² As such, he acted as a philosophical bridge between the classic thought of antiquity and the modern interpretations of human rights, which still are developing today.

Historically, most view the history of human rights as originating in 1948 with the drafting and ratification of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UHDR). The declaration's adoption by the fledgling United Nations organization was a seminal event and established a precedent moving forward for

12. Jeremy Waldron, *God, Locke, and Equality: Christian Foundations in Locke's Political Thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 189.

the tenets of basic human dignity.^{13 14} Human rights was an especially potent issue at this juncture and its salience was understandable considering the prior half-century where atrocities had been committed against enemy combatants and innocents by both the Nazis and the Imperial Japanese. While the UHDR outlined a wide range of human rights issues and significantly moved the conversation forward to a globally recognized scale, it was hardly the first attempt to codify human rights.¹⁵ Throughout human history, gradual steps have been taken that have expanded and solidified the rights of individuals inherent simply by the conditionality of being a person. Human rights have been prevalent throughout history. First in antiquity, through the Reformation in Europe and to the modern day with the UHDR.

Back to the Basics: Conceptual and Measurement Issues in the Human Rights Literature

After considering how human rights developed throughout history, it is essential to explore what is meant conceptually when human rights are discussed. In fact, there is significant conceptual flexibility within the idea and human rights are evolving today to meet new needs and situational demands. Over time,

13. Aryeh Neier, *The International Human Rights Movement: A History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012).

14. Kathryn Sikkink, *Evidence for Hope: Making Human Rights Work in the 21st Century* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2017).

15 . Paul Gordon Lauren, *The Evolution of International Human Rights: Visions Seen* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2003).

human rights have evolved to encompass more aspects of the human condition. First, its necessary to assess the notion of human rights as a viable and moral source of inquiry is essential. Then, second, the discussion can move forward to the conceptual definition of what human rights entails. One might consider the theoretical conception of human rights as a series of concentric circles, beginning with a core and moving outward away from the center while simultaneously becoming broader and encompassing more space. At the most basic level, human rights are encapsulated within physical integrity rights. Physical integrity rights represent the individual and their personal body. They have the right to be free from physical harm and to control the direction of their own body and will. Moving outward, civil and political rights are related to physical integrity rights because physical repression can often be politically motivated as a consequence for dissent. Yet, political and civil human rights represent the ability of the individual to express themselves publicly, and simultaneously be treated as equal in civil society regardless of their physical, religious or other intangible attributes. Finally, social and economic rights are the broadest and most subject to debate and interpretation. Factors such as wages, lifestyle, education, and opportunity are categorized under the umbrella of social and economic rights. As such, there is still considerable fuzziness over precisely what these rights entail and how they can be enforced.

Some of the earliest work in the study of human rights by political scientists had little to do with assessing how or if the rights of human beings were being recognized or what were the correlated phenomenon that possibly influenced certain levels of these rights. Instead, studies largely focused on the concept of human rights and its moral legitimacy as a field of inquiry within social sciences. Early research questions centered on whether it was ethically justifiable to attempt to study something as reprehensible as violations of human freedoms in a scientific manner.¹⁶ Some scholars believed that it was wrong to potentially sterilize human rights abuses by attempt to quantify violations for study. Regardless of the moral question the study and measurement of human rights has been integral in understanding the scope and breadth of respect for fundamental human rights. According to Landman, establishing a rigorous and systematic study of human rights serves a multitude of purposes. Inquiry allows further classification of violations which allows more systematic monitoring and recording of violations.¹⁷ Further, better record-keeping of violations allows trends and patterns to be recognized through cross-sectional analysis. By looking at violations over the course of an extended period of time and a sufficient sample of units, predictions can be made. These predictions, according to Landman, offer substantial policy benefits in that violations can be theoretically explained, and

16. David Louis Cingranelli, *Human Rights: Theory and Measurement* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1988).

17. Todd Landman, "Measuring Human Rights: Principle, Practice and Policy," *Human Rights Quarterly* 26 (November 2004).

reduced in future cases.¹⁸ Thus, the saliency and political importance of human rights as an area of formal analysis is obvious. By understanding the concept more fully, lives of individuals around the world can be greatly enriched.

The term human rights can be ambiguously broad. When researchers indicate that they are analyzing human rights the precise focus of their question can be difficult to immediately ascertain. Therefore, when discussing human rights, it is not uncommon for two researchers to mean two different things. Conceptually human rights are especially broad and includes a range of finer, more specific sub-concepts. At the most fundamental level, human rights can be divided into four different components. Human rights can be viewed as either being political, social, economic, or civil in nature.^{19 20 21} The traditional definition and understanding of human rights, which is constructed through political and civil human rights, is akin to what a majority of the population understand human rights to entail. Civil and political human rights make up the core of human rights resolutions and laws. Civil and political human rights are fundamental in that they serve as the basis to all levels of human physical

18. Ibid., 909.

19. William Felice, "Can World Poverty be Eliminated?," *Human Rights and Human Welfare*, 3 (2003): 136.

20. Maria Green, "What We Talk About When We Talk About Indicators: Current Approaches to Human Rights Measurement," *Human Rights Quarterly*, 23.4 (2001).

21. M. Rodwan Abouharb and David Cingranelli, *Human Rights and Structural Adjustment* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

integrity rights. More importantly, these are basic freedoms which one is entitled to simply because they are human.²² If individuals do not have equality on all levels of these basic and fundamental human freedoms it is difficult to consider them full members of the society in which they live and operate.²³ Furthermore, it seems that it is impossible for there to be any development into higher levels of social and economic human rights which have been outlined by some researchers without a firm foundation of recognition in these basic political and civil human rights.²⁴ In other words, while the definition of what is specifically a human right continues to evolve and accrete new statuses as time progresses and individuals become more enlightened and informed of the world around them, it appears unlikely that recognition of those new definitions will be recognized or honored unless these basic fundamental freedoms are granted to all members of the society interested in bolstering its levels of human rights recognition. Political and Civil human rights are considered first generation rights because they were the first to be established and widely accepted as norms accepted.²⁵ ²⁶ Recognition of these first-generation rights is prerequisite for acceptance and enforcement of later

22. Jack Donnelly, *Universal Human Rights: In Theory and Practice* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003), 10.

23. *Ibid.*, 12-13.

24. Abouharb and Cingranelli 2007.

25. Margaret P. Karns and Karen A. Mingst, *International Organizations: The Politics and Processes of Global Governance* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2010).

26. Karen A. Mingst and Margaret P. Karns, *The United Nations in the 21st Century* (Cambridge: Westview Press, 2007).

generation rights. Without basic respect for political and civil security, it is impossible to move further toward recognizing other aspects of human rights. It is evident, therefore, that these basic freedoms which are contained within the conception of civil and political human rights are essential for the well-being and dignity of all human beings.

The two other aspects of human rights are not as widely recognized as integral components of human rights respect; however, economic and social rights are gaining traction with academic and activist audiences. Economic and social rights entail aspects of society such as the right to social security, the right to economic growth and wealth, the right to continuous improvement of living conditions, and the right to development.^{27 28} These formulations of human rights initially seem to be difficult to defend as fundamental human rights that all are entitled to receive, yet, as globalization becomes a more powerful force within our world, many researchers and authors are arguing for them as an engrained aspect of the conversation and discourse when discussing the definition of human rights. Every person's right to economic and social welfare is fiercely advocated by Felice in what he calls the "global new deal" which is seen as a global mimicry of Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal Program.²⁹ Further, these economic and

27. Donnelly 2003.

28. Abouharb and Cingranelli 2007, 32-33.

29. William F. Felice, *The Global New Deal: Economic and Social Human Rights in World Politics* (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2010). 10-11.

social rights are being increasingly recognized by international agencies and organizations concerned with the improvement and recognition of human rights around the globe. According to Abouharb and Cingranelli:

The UDHR, for example recognizes the right to social security (Article 22), to work, to just and favorable conditions of work, to protection against unemployment, to equal pay for equal work, to an existence worthy of human dignity (Article 23), to rest and leisure, to reasonable limitations on working hours, to periodic holidays with pay (Article 24), to a standard of living adequate to maintain health and well-being, to food, clothing, housing and medical care, to necessary social services, to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age, or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control (Article 25), to free elementary education, and to higher education on the basis of merit (Article 26)³⁰

Clearly, some of these social and economic rights which are increasingly being recognized by authorities and agencies with the progression of time are rather vague, and, therefore, difficult to defend and advocate. For example, “an existence worthy of human dignity” is not specific and leaves a great deal of room for interpretation. It might be argued in one case that the individual was not given the opportunity for an existence worthy of human dignity, while in a precisely similar scenario; it was deemed that the individual was granted an existence which met the standards of human dignity. When compared with the other facets of social and economic human rights which have been outlined, it does seem that we can garner a semblance of an understanding of what precisely constitutes “an existence worthy of human dignity.” It should also be noted that many of these

30. Abouharb and Cingranelli 2007, 32-33.

basic economic and social human rights which these researchers described are not even recognized or honored in nations which are typically perceived as adherents and honorees of human rights. Many of these economic and social rights have not been as readily accepted or recognized within states or even internationally as the civil and political aspects of human rights have been.

One of the most interesting aspects of human rights which has been advocated in recent years, and is related theoretically to economic rights, is the “right to development.” Even the authors, Abouharb and Cingranelli assert that the right to development is difficult to define and, therefore, subject to some degree of debate.³¹ Despite the apparent ambiguity which is inherent within the subject, Cingranelli and Abouharb asserted that, “the emphasis is upon the simultaneous achievement of economic growth and the realization of economic and social rights.”³² Thus, the definition of the right to development contains:

the right to food, the right to health, the right to education the right to housing, and other economic, social, and cultural rights, as well as all the civil and political rights together with the rates of growth of GDP and other financial, technical and institutional resources that enable any improvement in the well-being of the entire population and the realization of the rights to be sustained.³³

It is abundantly clear, therefore, that the definition of human rights is constantly evolving with the passage of time and with the enlightenment of humanity as a whole. As people become more aware of the problems and the crises which

31. Ibid. 33.

32. Ibid. 33.

33. Ibid. 33.

negatively or adversely affect individuals they seek to understand how to ameliorate the harmful cause which had established a dilemma. As a result, things which are determined to be beneficial to human well-being are categorized as a human right which is to be possessed by all individuals, and likewise those things which are not seen as conducive to human integrity are deemed to be an affront to the integral rights which all people possess. In this sense then, it is clear that the definition of human rights has evolved in recent years. It was once maintained that the traditional view of human rights which contained rights such as the right to vote, the freedom of religion, freedom from discrimination, and other similar rights fell within the realm and domain of human rights; however, with the progression of understanding and the integration of societies and beliefs, the definition of fundamental human rights and freedoms has evolved and acquired further explanations. Development itself is seen as a potential field for the expansion of human rights.³⁴ Economic successes and economic parity have been conceptually framed as a new terrain for human rights protections at the domestic and international level through an expansion of policy.³⁵ It seems that as time progresses further that the understanding of what precisely is meant by human

34. Amartya Sen, "Human Rights and Development," in *Development as a Human Right: Legal, Political and Economic Dimensions*, ed. Bard A, Andreassen and Stephen M. Marks (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006), 5-6.

35. Arjun Sengupta, "The Human Right to Development," in *Development as a Human Right: Legal, Political and Economic Dimensions*, ed. Bard A, Andreassen and Stephen M. Marks (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006), 33.

rights will continue to expand and develop. Whereas physical integrity rights were not globally recognized for years, social and economic aspects of human rights are continuing to gain traction with both scholars and policy makers. It is clear, however, that there are a number of definitions which have already been established which researchers are able to utilize and, therefore, study the effects of certain social factors upon human rights.

Indeed, in the United States, the Affordable Care Act established a precedent where medical care is now perceived as a human right of all citizens and non-citizens in the nation. Just via the condition of being human one is entitled to medical care that is provided and paid by the state. Fundamentally, the right to medical care occupies a space within the realm of a social or economic right. Due to the expansion of the scope of human rights in the theoretical debate, issues such as health care, college education, minimum income and even access to information through access to the internet are discussed as measurable indicators of human rights within a locale.³⁶ Development rights that are encapsulated within the connotation of social and economic rights diverge largely from the more basic and fundamental recognitions of human rights that are generally accepted and recognized by many governments and international bodies. Newer,

36. Rajeev Malhotra, "Towards Implementing the Right to Development: A Framework for Indicators and Monitoring Methods," in *Development as a Human Right: Legal, Political and Economic Dimensions*, ed. Bard A. Andreassen and Stephen M. Marks (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006), 199.

and broader definitional conceptualizations of human rights are gaining substantial traction in the academic literature. The transition from postulation to policy might take some amount of time and reorientation of culture. Further, even were these types of rights to be broadly, or even universally, accepted there is no certainty that nations would have the capacity or capability to implement these variants of human rights in level that would meet the international standard. If on the other hand, the universally accepted level of accommodation was so low that every nation could meet their social and economic rights obligations then it begs the question of why implement a standard at all if the standard is essentially no standard.

Human rights, conceptually and theoretically has evolved tremendously in the time since the earliest conceptions began to formulate within the codified laws of ancient civilizations. In the past few hundred years, the relationship between citizens and the state have aided in the realization of people that there is a responsibility on the part of the state to seek to protect people from harm and to mitigate the threat to their person through various forms of violence. This responsibility is especially strong when considering violence that forms as a function of the capacity of the state and its leadership. Considering John Locke, upon leaving the State of Nature, the social contract between the state and the individual demands that the state fulfills its obligations to the protection of the life

and person of the individuals who are within it.³⁷ Argumentation from this line of philosophy helped to form the discourse of the American founders. Likewise, the atrocities and the human suffering perpetrated by the Soviets, Nazis in Germany, and other regimes demanded action through the UDHR. In the contemporary day and age, the debate rests largely on inequality. People are often most active and vocal about the potential issues that they view and witness. As such, social and economic rights are becoming a source of increased debate between scholars, policy-makers, and individual citizens alike. With the passage of time and the acceptance of certain aspects of life as a human right, it is likely that the conceptual definition of human rights will continue to expand. Although now, the periphery of human rights conceptualization rests at issues such as the right to healthcare, the right to education, and the right to a certain economic wage. In the future, human rights can potentially expand outward to unforeseen areas such as the right to opportunity, wherein every individual is entitled to the right to have equal opportunity regardless of skill or aptitude. In this respect then, human rights expansion might could arguably become counterproductive to societal outcomes rather than beneficial to the well-being of a healthy and functioning society. It does seem likely that the expansion of the concept will continue with the passage of time though.

37. Robert A. Goldwin, "John Locke," in *History of Political Philosophy*, ed. Leo Strauss and Joseph Cropsey (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 491-492.

Human rights as a monolithic concept can be nebulous and subject to ambiguity. Considering human rights as a series of concentric circles where each layer builds upon the previous is a useful tool for dissecting the intricacies of the concept of human rights. At the core of the circle is the most basic and fundamental variation of human rights, physical integrity rights. Moving outward, civil and political rights appear. In many nations, these are tied into physical integrity rights as fundamental liberties that one should expect by virtue of the quality of being human. Finally, social and economic rights represent the newest frontier of rights theory. While these rights seem to be too idealistic or too broad to make into policy, actions such as the Affordable Care Act and the push for higher minimum wage as a right represent valid attempts to normalize this aspect of human rights.

Globalization and its Influence on Human Rights

Integration of national economies and of information have functioned to make the world a more local place than it was mere decades ago. At the international level, economies of nations are intertwined and dependent on one another. The stability or instability of one nation's economy can greatly impact the economic functions of other nations around the world. Corporations are no longer limited to operations in a single state. Instead, they operate simultaneously out of numerous nations and do business around the world. Economics are not the only factor leading to the integration of the world community. Information

technology has proliferated tremendously in the past few decades through mediums such as the internet and satellite television. Today, it is possible for any person in practically any nation on the planet to communicate with others around the globe instantaneously. The amalgamation of these uniting forces is globalization and its impact have tremendous implications for many facets of political reality, especially when considering human rights. Thus, globalization operates at two levels which are to be addressed. First, there is the integration of national economies and second there is the advancement and proliferation of information and technology.

Many theorists posit that economic globalization has some type of an effect upon how a particular nation recognizes the rights of its citizens, there is a disagreement between scholars and researchers as to whether that effect is positive or negative. Voluminous amounts of research have been conducted to ascertain where there is even any statistical relationship between a country's level of economic integration into the world economy and its recognition of human rights. The results of empirical testing of liberal theory are equally divided in determining whether globalization and FDI in developing nations is conducive to human rights integrity in recipient nations. Blanton and Blanton³⁸, Harrelson-

38. Shannon Lindsey Blanton and Robert G. Blanton, "What Attracts Foreign Investors? An Examination of Human Rights and Foreign Direct Investment," *Journal of Politics*, 69.1 (2007).

Stephens and Callaway³⁹, and Meyer⁴⁰ argue that economic globalization and human rights integrity are positively related. In contrast, Abouharb and Cingranelli find that structural adjustment programs increase the likelihood of physical integrity rights violations, and Li and Reuveny⁴¹ assert that economic globalization actually hinders democratization in integrating nations.

Many political theorists have offered a liberal theoretical perspective to understand the relationship between economic integration and human rights infractions by the state as they understand it. The central proposition of the liberal theoretical approach is that the greater the extent to which a nation is economically integrated into the world economic system the more likely that the government of that particular country will grant and ensure basic human rights to its citizens; therefore, for liberals, globalization is a beneficial factor for the achievement and recognition of basic fundamental human rights.⁴² From the liberal perspective, a positive relationship is produced between the independent and dependent variables; that is, as economic globalization increases, so too does the level of human rights recognition in a country. First, the level of

39. Julie Harrelson-Stephens and Rhonda L. Callaway, "Does Trade Openness Promote Security Rights in Developing Countries? Examining the Liberal Perspective," *International Interactions*, 29 (2003).

40. William H. Meyer, "Human Rights and Multinational Corporations: Theory and Quantitative Analysis," *Human Rights Quarterly*, 18 (1996).

41. Quan Li and Rafael Reuveny, "Economic Globalization and Democracy: An Empirical Analysis," *British Journal of Political Science*, 33 (2003).

42. Harrelson-Stephens and Callaway, 2003.

interdependence among states has been tremendously increased as a result of the process of economic globalization. As a result of this increased interdependence among states created by globalization, the domestic policies established and created by governments (especially their policies regarding fundamental human rights) are susceptible to foreign pressure. This foreign pressure is exerted on government policies through economic sanctions; therefore, if a state has become integrated into the world economy it is less likely that the government in that state will repress its citizens than if it were not heavily integrated into the international economy. It must be noted that there is a substantial amount of anecdotal evidence for this argument. Countries such as North Korea and other gross human rights violators are unlikely to be concerned with the threat of sanctions because they lack substantial economic ties to the global economy.

Globalization has also led to advancement in the power and simplicity of technologies and the diffusion of technology across the globe. Technology which was once only imaginable is now in the hands of common individuals in practically every nation. In many cases, the poor have access to cell phones which can take and send pictures or videos almost instantaneously. As globalization spreads and nations integrate information flows can be transmitted between nations with ease and tremendous speed. Thus, a nation which is highly integrated into the global economic system, the liberals argue, will refrain from human rights abuses against the citizenry because of the speed at which

information of those grievances can be transmitted to the outside world. It is not hard to imagine an individual in a repressive country recording an act of state violence with a cell phone and sending the information to others outside the country.

Likewise, humanitarian organizations are able to use mediums such as the internet and the media to garner awareness of violations which are almost occurring in real time. Consequently, if a nation is engaged in human rights abuses and the information of those abuses is spread to the outside world, pressure by foreign governments and other non-state actors interested in maintaining human rights are likely to induce the violating nation to alter its policies regarding human rights. Third, liberals argue that global economic integration encourages the state to de-centralize its political and economic power. As the state decentralizes its political and economic power it has a reduced ability to commit human rights repressions against its citizens. Since the state is less able to repress its citizens because of de-centralization due to increased integration, globalization helps to strengthen human rights recognition and bring about a cessation of human rights infractions.

Blanton and Blanton, Harrelson-Stephens and Callaway and Meyer each make the argument that human rights and economic integration are positively correlated. These scholars base their research in the theoretical foundations of liberalism. As wealthier, more developed nations invest more resources into

developing nations through FDI or through the placement of multinational corporations, wealth is spread throughout the nation and people are enriched due to the diffusion of capital.^{43 44} As wealth increases, individuals, especially women, are able to become more educated, afford better healthcare for themselves and their children, and are able to influence the government for stronger civil and political rights.⁴⁵ Blanton and Blanton ask a slightly different research question than Meyer and Harrelson-Stephens and Callaway. They ask whether nations that have higher levels of human rights recognition will attract FDI. As a result of their analysis, they find that, “countries with greater respect for personal integrity rights tend to attract significantly higher levels of FDI.”⁴⁶ Investors are interested in the reputational gains obtained from investing in a nation that respects the rights of its citizens, and more importantly, those nations that respect the human rights of its citizens tend to have a more educated workforce.⁴⁷ Scholars such as these, who advocate that investment and human rights share a strong positive relationship, maintain that multinational and foreign economic integration into developing nations is horizontal rather than vertical. As foreign actors invest in developing nations, the benefit of the integration is extended outward and all of the citizenry is benefited.

43. Harrelson-Stephens and Callaway, 2003.

44. Meyer 1996.

45. Ibid., 396-397.

46. Blanton and Blanton 2007, 149-150.

47. Ibid., 145.

Not all political scholars believe that globalization has a positive and beneficial impact upon whether a nation guarantees and recognizes the fundamental rights of its citizens. Many political and social scholars maintain that economic globalization, in fact, has a negative impact on the state's willingness to guarantee basic human rights. The central proposition of this theoretical perspective of economic globalization is that the greater the extent to which a country has economically integrated itself into the global economic system, the likelihood that it will grant fundamental rights to its citizens is decreased. The relationship between the independent variable, economic globalization, and the dependent variable, recognition of human rights, is negative. Scholars arguing against the traditional liberal theoretical approach assert that economic globalization promotes the development of authoritarian regimes which are necessary to provide stability to the political environment for the trading practices of multinational corporations. Authoritarian regimes are better suited over democratic governments to implement domestic pro-market policies which aid the integration of domestic economies into the larger international economy. Why should this necessarily be the case? Economic globalization creates winners and losers and those who are hurt economically by globalization tend to demand protection from their government. In the face of protests and demonstrations against pro-market reforms, democratic governments are likely to acquiesce to the protesters and offer protection to industries because of their electoral vulnerability. In a democratic state, if voters are unhappy with a

policy, they respond by voting the policy makers out of office. Unlike democratic governments, authoritarian governments lack the electoral vulnerability of their democratic counterparts and can effectively quell any protests which might arise. Since there is no accountability to the citizenry, authoritarian regimes are able to use severe means to cease any public unrest concerning governmental policy. These authoritarian governments are also the most likely to regularly infringe upon the fundamental human rights of individuals. Therefore, the process of global economic integration tends to prefer and favor a form of political leadership which denies human rights and represses the freedoms of its citizens.

Just as with the liberal perspective, there is a fair amount of anecdotal evidence which supports the argument that economic globalization is detrimental for human rights and democracy in developing nations. For example, in 1953 and in 1954 the CIA intervened in Iran against the Mossadegh regime which had nationalized American oil company assets in Iran. Furthermore, a year later the CIA was responsible for the coup d'etat codenamed Operation PBSUCCESS, which resulted in the ousting of the populist government of Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala. Arbenz had attempted to institute land reforms which would grant peasant farmers arable land which had been the possession of a small contingent of wealthy individuals. After the coup, the CIA placed a pro-American military junta in command of the government. This regime, which was promoted by the United Fruit Company, brutally repressed the people of Guatemala. Similarly, in

Chile during September of 1973, the government of Salvador Allende was overthrown in a CIA backed coup which was promoted by International Telephone and Telegraph. This coup established the repressive regime of Augusto Pinochet which lasted until 1990. Under the government of Augusto Pinochet, the rights of Chileans were routinely and viciously violated.

Statistical analysis, conducted by Abouharb and Cingranelli and Li and Reuveny offer support to the counter argument that globalization is not a panacea, but is instead a force that dampens human rights and democratic goals. In their analysis, these authors examine the influence of globalization and find that human rights and democracy actually suffer as economic globalization increases. Repression according to Abouharb and Cingranelli occurs in the wake of structural adjustment because the economy of the adjusting nation is harmed and the leadership of the nation is inclined to repress on all aspects of the CIRI human rights index. Nations entering into structural adjustment face both internal and external pressure which leads to increases in torture, extrajudicial killings, political imprisonment, and disappearances.⁴⁸ Further, Li and Reuveny arrive at a similar conclusion that democratic functions are curtailed through economic globalization. As financial capital becomes more fluid and easily transferable, governments are not able to meet the demands of the public for goods.⁴⁹ Results

48. Abouharb and Cingranelli 2007, 253.

49. Li and Reuveny 2003, 33;53.

such as these offer a solid critique of the traditional appraisal of economic globalization. Instead of bettering the lives of individuals through increased education, health, and political openness, economic globalization leads to physical integrity rights violations and lower levels of democracy within globalizing nations.

As the world becomes more deeply integrated, the effects of globalization on human rights have become increasingly strong and noticeable. As shown, globalization operates on two distinct fronts that have the potential to impact human rights levels. First, there is heightened integration of economics between nations. Second, and potentially more substantial, is the advancement of affordable technology and the sharing of information. Much like a spider's web, movement in one area are felt in another and the consequences of policy cascades outward like ripples. Further, due to the advancements in communication technology, it is impossible for repressions of individuals' rights to stay a secret. Every person with a phone or camera is a reporter who can broadcast his or her perspective to the world audience through the internet in a moment. Because of the openness of information and the integration of the world economy, many citizens who would typically be uninformed about global political situations are actually educated. Because of their connection with the world, citizens are apt to advocate for increased governmental policy that reflect stronger rights protections for individuals around the world.

Human Rights and US Foreign Policy

Policy-makers are responsive to their constituents. Due to the proliferation of information and the integration of the world community, leaders in the United States have been compelled to address human rights issues as a matter of foreign policy. With the passage of time, the role of human rights has functioned as a policy impetus as well as an outcome. Human rights, therefore, has often simultaneously been the motivation of states to engage in foreign policy while certain policies are often said to exacerbate poor human rights conditions in a target state. Even worse, it is often argued that uninformed, or poorly planned foreign policy endeavors can have the potential to create human rights violations as a second or third generation consequence over longer periods of time.⁵⁰ Stated simply, policy matters for human rights and there is a documented relationship between human rights and multiple variants of foreign policy. Economic sanctions are but one aspect of foreign policy, crafted for an individual and unique purpose in the scope of a nation's foreign policy repertoire. First, human rights can operate as an input for foreign policy initiatives and, likewise, a second option can be seen where foreign policy can influence human rights in another nation. Each will be analyzed in turn.

Up through the mid-1980's, a majority of the research into this question had concluded that human rights were, in fact, not a part of the calculus which

50. Sowell 2009, 2-4.

Congress considered in allocating aid funds to nations. David L. Cingranelli and Thomas E. Pasquarello published their article “Human Rights Practices and the Distribution of U.S. Foreign Aid to Latin American Countries,” and found that the opposite was true.⁵¹ The results of their research which they obtain lead them to argue that the judgment of American leaders to provide foreign assistance to nations does include an assessment of the quality of its human rights practices. This study not only created a controversy in the academic community because the results differed from the status quo of previous research, but it also drew a storm of criticism over the empirical and methodological choices of the authors. As a result, many critical responses which attempted to address the deficiencies of this study and obtain more robust conclusions were published in the years immediately following the publication of this article.

In attempting their study on the relationship between military and economic aid and the human rights recognition level of recipient nations, Cingranelli and Pasquarello make many important strides toward making the study of human rights more of an empirical and quantitative endeavor than a normative one as it had been in previous years. First, Cingranelli and Pasquarello differentiate between the decision to provide aid to a nation, or what they call the “gatekeeping phase” and the amount to provide to a receiving nation, or the

51. David L. Cingranelli and Thomas E. Pasquarello, “Human Rights Practices and the Distribution of U.S. Foreign Aid to Latin America,” *American Journal of Political Science*, 29.3 (1985).

secondary phase. It is the second stage of this analysis, the amount which is designated for assistance, which has been frequently studied in previous research, the authors contend.⁵² Therefore, the transformation of this research into a two-level analysis only helps to explain the intricacies of the relationship and the different processes which are purported to be occurring. Further, Cingranelli and Pasquarello were tasked with quantifying human rights recognition and abuses if they desired to study their project from a quantitative vantage. At the time of this analysis, quantification of a concept as complex and generally murky as human rights recognition and national practices had yet to be attempted by many human rights scholars.⁵³ In quantifying human rights practices data for most of the nations in Latin America for the period of 1979-1982, Cingranelli and Pasquarello attempted to accomplish a very difficult task. While their study was ambitious in its goals, there are many aspects where the merit of this research is deficient and requires significant revision and reevaluation in order to be considered methodologically, empirically, and most importantly, theoretically robust.

First, their choice of only examining countries in Latin America appears rather suspect. They maintain that an exclusive focus on Latin America is acceptable because there was enough variation to test their hypotheses.⁵⁴ Cingranelli and Pasquarello do not consider that this geographic region could

52. Cingranelli and Pasquarello 1985, 540.

53. Ibid., 540.

54. Ibid., 544.

potentially be different from other regions of the world such as Asia, Africa, or the Middle East. Therefore, simply examining cases in Latin America provides no solid ground for empirical comparison. It could be that the proximity of these nations to the United States somehow impacts whether they will receive military and economic aid, and how much. Essentially, from the analysis presented it is impossible for the reader to know. Steven C. Poe attempts to correct this problem of generalizability in his response to the work by Cingranelli and Pasquarello, “Human Rights and the Allocation of U.S. Military Assistance.” Instead of merely looking at nations in Latin America, Poe includes a randomly selected sample of forty nations which are not within the region of Latin America and runs the same statistical analysis of these nations’ human rights practices and if, and how much aid is given to these nations.⁵⁵ While this can be described as a step in the right direction, it does not offer the generalizability that a sample of more nations can provide.

Following this criticism, it also becomes evident that the longitudinal analysis incorporated by Cingranelli and Pasquarello is not really that chronologically long. Their analysis only covers Latin American countries for the period of 1979-1982, and other responses fail to correct for this design flaw even

55. Steven C. Poe, “Human Rights and the Allocation of U.S. Military Assistance,” *Journal of Peace Research*, 28.2 (1991), 212.

though some mention this as a problem explicitly.^{56 57 58} There was some speculation by all of the authors who covered this topic that there would be differences between the Carter and Reagan administrations with respect to if and how much aid is offered to a nation with a certain level of rights practices. With the simple sampling window provided in each study, it is impossible to make any solid conclusions and prohibits the corroboration of any theory which might have been constructed which concerns partisan presidential politics.

Likewise, one is left wondering why Cingranelli and Pasquarello chose to exclude El Salvador from their analysis of Latin America. Because of the uniqueness of El Salvador, they chose to omit it from the statistical analysis for fear that it would diminish the statistical significance of their results. As both Carleton and Stohl and McCormick and Mitchell highlight in their rebuttal of Cingranelli and Pasquarello's research, Jamaica could also be considered an outlier and could also be considered unique, however, the authors did not choose to omit this nation from their research. Ultimately, it seems as if the exclusion of El Salvador was simply a matter of convenience in obtaining the desired results. When both Carleton and Stohl and McCormick and Mitchell include El Salvador

56. David Carleton and Michael Stohl, "The Role of Human Rights in U.S. Foreign Assistance Policy: A Critique and Reappraisal," *American Journal of Political Science*, 31.4 (1987).

57. James M. McCormick and Neil Mitchell, "Is U.S. Aid Really Linked to Human Rights in Latin America?," *American Journal of Political Science*, 32.1 (1988).

58. Poe 1991.

in their analysis, they find that the significance uncovered by Cingranelli and Pasquarello evaporates and the results no longer hold any statistical significance. Therefore, it does appear that Cingranelli and Pasquarello were merely looking for any way to present statistically significant findings. After all, readers rarely become excited over a conclusion resulting in null findings.

There are also potential problems of bias associated with the data which Cingranelli and Pasquarello utilize to measure human rights practices and recognition. The authors use State Department data which they argue is useful for this analysis despite the fact that it might be biased either for or against certain nations contingent upon their relations with the United States. Still, the authors argue that this data is still acceptable since this is the data and information which members of Congress will utilize to inform their decisions regarding financial assistance and the human rights policies held by the nations in consideration. All of the authors responding to this initial analysis attempt to correct for this problem by using not only the State Department data originally used by Cingranelli and Pasquarello but also other measures of human rights from sources such as Freedom House and Amnesty International.^{59 60 61} The incorporation of these sources of data serve as a comparison to see if one data set is, in fact, biased, and

59. Carleton and Stohl 1987.

60. McCormick and Mitchell 1988.

61. Poe 1991.

also to add a degree of robustness to any findings which refute the null hypothesis.

Emilie Hafner-Burton presents a somewhat similar argument about American and European incentives to engage in free trade with different regions of the world. She traces the evolution of American and European humanitarian standards within free trade agreements. Further, she argued that these standards are not mere window dressings that only serve protectionist interest within the United States and Europe but that these human rights stipulations have actually caused observable benefits for the human rights of those residing in trading partner nations. Both American and European lawmakers have passed laws limiting those states which are eligible for preferential trade agreements. Hafner-Burton maintains that the advances in human rights recognition has been substantial with many nations advancing beyond their initial commitment to rights.^{62 63} Even nations that have a lengthy record of violations have shown signs of progress and reform due to their attempt to join preferential trade agreements with Europe and the West. Turkey is a prime example of a nation that has advanced its rights record in an attempt to join the European Union.⁶⁴ While

62. Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, "Trading Human Rights: How Preferential Trade Agreements Influence Government Repression," *International Organization*, 59.3 (2005).

63. Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, *Forced to be Good: Why Trade Agreements Boost Human Rights* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009).

64. *Ibid.*, 152.

it has instituted some reforms in an attempt to join the European Union, its human right record works against what democratic institutions it has. Although, Turkish officials are quick to dispel current or past human rights violations as cause for the delay in European Union membership and instead rely upon cultural distinctions.⁶⁵ Whether or not these assertions are correct on the part of Turkey, it cannot be denied that the human rights record of Turkey leaves a great deal to be desired.

China, most significantly, poses a serious challenge to Hafner-Burton's arguments and findings. The powerful Asian state does not have a good humanitarian track record, yet both the United States and Europe are forced to trade with the global giant. With China commanding such global economic might, there is no other option but to trade with China regardless of political, civil, economic, and social violations of human rights. China's power also threatens to undermine the ability of the West to force their requirements of good humanitarian policy on the rest of the world. Those nations believing that they cannot implement human rights standards, or simply not willing implement radical changes now have a viable alternative to seeking out preferential trade with the United States and Europe. Yet, China is hardly democratic in governance. Economic sanctions leveraged at the Chinese government might

65. Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of the Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996), 33-35.

influence human rights conditions to deteriorate, however, not likely for the same reason that would occur within a democracy.

Within the context of global politics, human rights occupy an interesting space of being both a cause and effect of American foreign policy actions. In choosing which nations to engage in trade and aid agreements, the human rights levels within the partner nation are frequently assessed. Further, due to the impact of globalization, it is politically difficult for leaders in the United States and other democratic states to implement agreements with states that systematically violate the rights of their populations because of the political cost. The converse is also shown to be true, that human rights are impacted by foreign policy. Deeper integration into the world system often strengthens human rights norms. Through repeated iterations of interactions and the spread of values, human rights levels are increased. This holds true about many different variations of human rights, from physical integrity through to social and economic rights.

Human Rights as the End of State Sovereignty?

Intervention into the affairs of a nation is arguably one of the strongest foreign policy options that any state can exercise. One of the most currently cited reasons for usurping the sovereignty of a nation and intervening in some form is for violation of human rights standards. Traditionally, states would only face

military intervention if the rights of white Christians were repressed.⁶⁶ The salience of human rights as an impetus for intervention spread as the application of human rights was recognized as belonging to all groups of people despite nationality, race, or religion. Both Martha Finnemore and Wayne Sandholtz argue that humanitarian intervention has become more commonplace in the latter portion of the twentieth century, especially in the wake of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union.^{67 68} Further, it is almost politically compulsory that nations in the international system intervene to prevent human rights abuses.⁶⁹

Wayne Sandholtz in his essay *Humanitarian Intervention: Global Enforcement of Human Rights?* assessed the subject of the forceful intervention into a sovereign nation for humanitarian reasons. Sandholtz asserts that ever since the Treaty of Westphalia, the state is the highest form of authority. Further, each state is sovereign and no other state has the authority to declare what is acceptable or permissible within the borders of another state. That was, however, until the twentieth century and the establishment of supra-national organizations such as the United Nations. Now, through world consensus, which has become far easier after the Cold War, there are legitimate motivations for violating the sovereignty

66. Martha Finnemore, *The Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs About the Use of Force*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003), 53.

67. Ibid., 52.

68. Wayne Sandholtz, "Humanitarian Intervention: Global Enforcement of Human Rights?," in *Globalization and Human Rights*, ed. Alison Brysk (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), 202-203.

69. Finnemore 2003, 84.

of another state. Sandholtz argued that there are necessary conditions which make the intervention of one nation into another for humanitarian reasons acceptable. These conditions include, but are not limited to, the right of individuals to live a life that is free from torture, murder, and violence by the hands of their own government.⁷⁰ Once any of these personal rights are violated, a gateway is provided for foreign powers to intervene with a legitimate use of force. These are only necessary conditions and not sufficient conditions. What this means is that under circumstances when a government commits violence against its subjects that the door is only open for the possibility of humanitarian intervention and that the necessary requisite conditions have been satisfied. It does not mean that forceful intervention is required or guaranteed by other nations within the international system.⁷¹

American leaders and many of their allies have exhibited more willingness to intervene into the affairs of those nations that are seen as violating the rights of their populations. Davenport collected data for 137 countries from the period of 1976-1996, dividing and assigning autocratic nations to one of seven categories: Personalist, Personalist hybrids, Military, Military hybrids, Single-party, Single-party hybrids, and Complex hybrids. Davenport concluded is that single-party regimes tend to violate the rights of their population and repress their people less

70. Sandholtz 2002, 208.

71. Ibid., 201-202.

than other forms of autocratic regimes.⁷² Davenport also concluded that military regimes are, “more inclined to use repressive techniques which are more directly within the realm of their area of expertise—physical violence.”⁷³ Therefore, there is a difference between certain types of autocratic governments. Of all the types of autocracies, Davenport concluded that single-party form is the least repressive and the least likely to institute policies of torture, murder, or forced disappearances. This suggests, as Davenport asserts, that the United States should not seek to completely reform every government on the face of the earth into a democratic entity, rather, the United States should focus on intervening and sanctioning only those autocracies which pose the highest threat to the physical safety of people; that is, the United States should be slow to become involved in single-party autocracies, but more willing to intervene in military regimes where human rights are being violated.⁷⁴

Conclusion

Human rights are a concept which has experienced a strong theoretical and empirical emergence in recent decades. While there have been massive conclusions derived through empirical application of human rights measurements there are still vast areas that are theoretically and empirically nebulous. Often

72. Christian Davenport, “State Repression and the Tyrannical Peace,” *Journal of Peace Research*, 44.4 (2007), 500.

73. Davenport 2007, 500.

74. *Ibid.*, 501.

research can be like a hydra, when one question is explored and answered, a multitude of new, equally imposing questions arise to the surface. As has been discussed, the groundwork has been established for deeper more theoretically stimulating inquiries. As a field of research human rights has evolved and grown in the sophistication of conceptual definition and in empirical measurement. Fundamentally, there are a number of variables which seem to offer hope of increased human rights levels in nations. One of the most foundational is democracy. As a nation increasingly transitions away from autocratic governance and toward a more representative system, the prospect for human rights abuses are reduced.⁷⁵ Democracy matters when compared against autocracy, furthermore, more representative democracies are often more likely to support stronger protections for human rights.⁷⁶ Ultimately, the goal of this endeavor is that by studying all of the various aspects of human rights, information can be supplied to policy-makers and activists seeking to aid individuals around the world.

When considering the full scope and breadth of human rights as it has been conceptualized, including physical, economic, social, developmental and other evolving formations of rights, it would be expected that democracies should have higher levels of each of these variants of rights, for reasons that will be further explored in the chapter dealing with democratic aspects of this analysis.

75. Landham 2013, 25.

76. David Beetham, *Democracy and Human Rights*, (Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers, 1999), 83-85.

The most fundamental and essential realization of human rights are those of physical integrity rights. Without basic protection of the body from violence or harm, it is impossible for development of any other aspect of human rights to be achieved or realized. Therefore, the scope of this analysis will focus on the most basic of human protections and individual rights, the protection of the physical body from harm from the governmental authority of a state.

Further, as will be explored in the next section, there is considerable variance amongst democracies as well. Human rights have often been explored through a lens of homogeneity (e.g. the outcome of foreign policies such as intervention, wars, or economic coercion). Likewise, there has been a marked tendency to dichotomize the analysis on human rights, especially physical integrity rights, among autocracies and democracies. But the question remains whether that is sufficient to facilitate the understanding of the full scope of physical integrity rights within a nation. The next section will attempt to parse out the differences between democracies and establish specific fundamental concepts for variances within democracy itself that is necessary to conduct this research.

CHAPTER THREE

HITTING THEM WHERE IT HURTS: THE ECONOMIC SIDE OF INTERNATIONAL COERCIVE DIPLOMACY

Introduction

In the previous chapter, it was shown that there are foreign policy inputs that can influence and shape human rights levels within the nation that is receiving the policy. Economic sanctions reside in a valuable middle-space for policy-makers who seek to alter the behavior or actions of other states. In considering coercive diplomacy as a spectrum, where talk, rhetoric, and negotiations represent one extreme and full-scale militarized conflict represent the other extreme, economic sanctions are a middle ground option for policy-makers.⁷⁷ In one respect, the act of implementing sanctions can represent an escalation in the urgency of the diplomacy on the part of the issuer thereby sending information via a signal as to the importance of specific issues to the target and the global community. For example, in negotiations with both Iran and North Korea, the United States commences their diplomatic negotiations, specifically over the development of weapons of mass destruction, with bilateral and multilateral talks and financial negotiations in the form of aid. Upon President Donald Trump taking office in 2017, it became evident that rhetoric and

77. Lisa L. Martin, *Coercive Cooperation: Explaining Multilateral Economic Sanctions* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1992).

negotiations were insufficient to accomplish the policy outcomes which the United States sought within Iran and North Korea. Consequently, the Trump administration reinstated the economic sanctions upon each nation and intensified their scope and severity. In both instances, the attention of the leaders within both nations was captured, however, it is uncertain at this point whether the sanctions will be effective in curbing the militaristic interests of either nation or whether they will continue their pursuit of nuclear weapons and delivery systems. That is a question for the efficacy of international sanctions as a diplomacy tool.⁷⁸ Further, it is unclear how the sanctions will impact the civilian population of North Korea. North Korea is not a democracy, however, as will be discussed later, because power is consolidated into a central figure, there is the possibility that sanctions will trickle down and be absorbed by the population rather than the leadership. Also, there is the propensity that even more extreme repression could follow the imposition of American sanctions upon North Korea.

This chapter will be comprised of three major sections. First, it is necessary to begin with an assessment of what comprise economic sanctions and their purpose in implementation. Second, consideration will be given for the conditions under which an economic sanction is most appropriate as a policy option. Finally, the effectiveness of economic sanctions as a form of coercive foreign policy will be analyzed. There are substantial arguments over each of

78. Martin 1992, 4-7.

these issues within the scope of the academic literature and each must be discussed in order to move forward with a unified theory that combines human rights, sanctions and democracy.

Economic Sanctions: A History

Historically, economic sanctions have been a primary policy tool for over a century, but they saw their maximum implementation in the 1990's, often coined the "Sanctions Decade" by many scholars and policy makers.⁷⁹ Contextually, this trend makes sense with respect to Cold War political realities. In the bipolar world, the United States, or the West as a whole implementing an economic sanction against a nation would be ineffective at best, and counterproductive at worst. Implementing a sanction against a country within the Soviet sphere of influence would hardly be considered reason for the target to change course because they received their financial backing from the Soviet Union. On the other hand, if a nation was outside of the communist sphere of influence, issuing a sanction and destabilizing a nation could produce a regime that would seek out Soviet help and expand the realm of communism. In the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union in the late 1980's and early 1990's, the United States emerged victorious from the Cold War and the dominant political,

79. Progressive Management, *Efficacy of Economic Sanctions: North Korea and Iran Case Study* (Progressive Management, 2017), 22-24.

military, and financial actor in a new world.⁸⁰ Sanctions, therefore, carried weight and their power was expanded. Therefore, it is unsurprising that they were heavily employed during this transitional period in world history. The conceptual framework of what precisely an economic sanction entails, and as an extension, their efficacy as foreign policy instruments must be addressed.

Coercion with a Cause: The Purpose of Economic Sanctions

Sanctions, as stated, are a form of coercive diplomacy. Sanctions are issued and implemented to elicit a change or alteration of some type in a foreign state. While sanctions are not as forceful in their ability to coerce a target as the threat of military intervention they remain a significant and less costly policy tool which can be utilized by political actors. First, the intention of implementing a sanction against another state will be addressed. Second, this principle will be applied to the case of the United States and Haiti, to show the purpose of economic sanctioning. Third, consideration over whether the sanctions were effective in the intended purpose can be considered.

Coercive diplomacy can be divided into three separate, yet related, categories: Type A, Type B, and Type C. Type A coercive diplomacy is intended to persuade a target to cease their actions short of achieving their intended policy

80. Saul Bernard Cohen, *Geopolitics: The Geography of International Relations* (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2015), 302-303.

outcome.⁸¹ Consider the case of a pair of nations in which the government in the first nation is about to adopt a policy of which the government of the second state is in opposition. The government of the second state might choose to issue sanctions, or at the very least, threaten to implement sanctions if the movement toward implementation of the policy is not abandoned. This would be an example of Type A coercive diplomacy. The Type B variant of coercive diplomacy varies only in that the intended goal of the issuing state is to persuade a target to retract a policy which has already been implemented. In the example outlined above, the only difference would be that the policy which is the subject of scrutiny would have already been implemented rather than in the process of adoption. Also, if sanctions are imposed upon a target state with the goal of Type A coercive diplomacy and the government obtains its goal, then the sanctions could be maintained (and most likely would be maintained) with the goal contained within the definition of Type B coercive diplomacy, to cause the target to reverse its actions. Finally, those states which engage in Type C coercive diplomacy seek to dismantle the political leadership in a target state and force them out of power in favor of a new government without an escalation to war.⁸² Type C coercive diplomacy is clearly the most ambitious and the most difficult variant to achieve. After all, as Hans J. Morgenthau argued in the political classic *Politics Among*

81. Horace A. Bartilow, "Diplomatic Victory Misunderstood: A Two-Level Game Analysis of U.S. Policy Toward Haiti." *Security Studies*. 10.4 (2001): 118.

82. *Ibid.*, 118.

Nations, actors are interested in maximizing power and, therefore, will be more likely to acquiesce when the issue concerns a policy rather than ceding their power and position.^{83 84} Clearly then, although sanctions can be homogenously described as coercive diplomacy, there are numerous distinctions within the concept of sanctions which can be parsed out. These distinctions have proven to be an impediment to a uniform understanding of sanctions in the academic literature. Much of the discordance can be traced to the debate over the related issues of what precisely a successful sanction looks like, and if economic sanctions are even effective as a means of coercion.

As mentioned above researchers have tended to examine the issue of economic sanctions by whether they are successful in the ambition which they were implemented to achieve. When examining the landscape of the academic literature on economic sanctions it quickly becomes evident that there is little consensus among scholars who have examined the topic of the general successfulness of economic sanctions as a means of foreign policy. Many scholars maintain that economic sanctions are ineffectual for their intended purpose. In contrast, there are many scholars who have findings which suggest that economic sanctions do work in a variety of manners.

83. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, *Principles of International Politics: People's Power Preferences and Perceptions* (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2006).

84. Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1960).

The 1990's was a period in which there was a tremendous increase in the number of sanctions as opposed to the number in previous decades. In fact, this increase was so dramatic that scholars analyzing sanctions termed this period as the "sanctions decade."⁸⁵ Therefore, anyone who wishes to select individual cases to examine the consequences of sanctions can select from a plethora of cases which are from diverse corners of the world, and just as crucial, they are somewhat recent allowing the researcher to look at incidents which occurred in the past two decades. Although there are many recent cases which researchers can draw from to study and analyze the various dynamics of sanctions, the case of sanctions which were imposed against the military junta by the United States has been especially appealing to researchers who desire to understand sanctions. It should be noted that the point here is not to conduct a qualitative case study on Haiti and the sanctions which were imposed against the military junta, or any other nation or regime for that matter, but to consider the results and the conclusions of scholars who have chosen to study the many facets of the sanctioning process through the lens of Haiti in the early to mid-1990's. The case of Haiti can lead to two different conclusions regarding the success of economic sanctions as a means of coercing foreign regimes.

85. Elizabeth D. Gibbons, *Sanctions in Haiti: Human Rights and Democracy Under Assault* (Westport: Praeger, 1999).

First, it could be concluded that the sanctions were ineffectual and that it was the threat of military intervention which prompted the junta to return power to President Jean-Bertrand Aristide. The logic of this argument is clear. Multilateral economic sanctions were imposed by both the United States and the United Nations upon Haiti very shortly after the coup which displaced Aristide from power and the junta did not cede power back to Aristide until it was abundantly clear that the United States had deployed troops and was ready to act militarily. As Elizabeth Gibbons states, “The ‘preponderance of evidence’ points unmistakably to sanctions’ disastrous impact on the Haitian economy and the welfare of ordinary, innocent citizens, even as they left their military target virtually unscathed.”⁸⁶ From this perspective, one can see that it was not the sanctions which led to the return of Aristide to power in 1994, it was the looming reality that the United States was about to imminently intervene into Haiti.

Second, multilateral economic sanctions were in fact effective in their goal of removing the governing junta from power. Bartilow argues that the economic sanctions worked to destabilize and fractionalize the ruling elite in Haiti over the course of the years during which they were in effect. Bartilow reports that, “Researchers from the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) concluded that the Haitian junta’s decision to cede power peacefully was largely due to the ways in which tighter sanctions weakened the military

86. Ibid., 99.

leaders will to resist American forces.”⁸⁷ Thus, economic sanctions can be effective in their goal, from attempting to change policies to the alternation of power within a nation, if the sanctions effectively target the ones who have the power and ability to implement the desired outcome. This is one area in which Bartilow and Gibbons are in concordance with their analysis of the case of sanctions in Haiti. For sanctions to be effective as mechanisms of coercive diplomacy they must affect those who are the actual targets and offer some utility for conceding to the demands of the initiating state. Thus, both authors argue for a re-evaluation of sanctioning policies because their effectiveness is contingent largely upon who in the target nation bears the burden of the sanction. Sanctions must be targeted in their implementation so that the leaders are unable to sidestep the costs of the sanctions or simply pass the punishment down upon the population. Three distinct ideas have been assessed here. First, the conditions over which a sanction might be implemented and instituted were highlighted. Subsequently, these principles were applied to the American interaction with Haiti during the period of junta governance. Third, and finally, it was considered whether the sanctions in that case were effective in their stated goal. Each of these ideas is fundamental for the understanding of how, why and when nations are apt to attempt to institute an economic sanction as a form of coercive policy against another state.

87. Bartilow 2001, 149.

Sanctions as Punishment: A Moral Approach

In contrast to the familiar arguments such as those put forth by many authors concerned with sanctions,^{88 89 90 91} Kim Richard Nossal puts forth the interesting argument that sanctions are in fact effective. But she argues that economic sanctions not be judged on their merit of achieving specific policy goals, that is, not for understanding sanctions as a form of economic coercion meant to force a nation to change a behavior or policy, but instead, sanctions should be viewed as a method of “international punishment.”⁹² Nossal highlights three motivations for punishing a regime via the sanctioning process: to compel, to deter, and for retribution.⁹³ The first two, compulsion and deterrence seem to be synonymous with the general understanding of sanctions provided by scholars such as in Marinov, Ang and Peksen, Lindsay⁹⁴, and Hart Jr.. She determined that when understanding sanctions as retributive punishment that they are “successful” even though they do not bring about a change in the target regime.

88. Adrian U-Jin Ang and Dursun Peksen, “When Do Sanctions Work? Asymmetric Perceptions, Issue Salience, and Outcomes,” *Political Research Quarterly*, 60.1 (2007).

89. Bartilow 2001.

90. Gibbons 1999.

91. Robert A. Hart Jr., “Democracy and the Successful Use of Economic Sanctions,” *Political Research Quarterly*, 53.2 (2000).

92. Kim Richard Nossal, “International Sanctions as International Punishment,” *International Organization*, 43.2 (1989), 303.

93. *Ibid.*, 316-319.

94. James M. Lindsay. “Trade Sanctions As Policy Instruments: A Re-Examination,” *International Studies Quarterly*, 30.2 (1986).

The successfulness of the sanctions instead comes from their ability to bring harm to the target regime.⁹⁵ In this regard then, sanctions which are issued in retribution as a form of punishment will always be “successful.” Nossal’s argument is not as concerned with the notion of coercive diplomacy in any variant and appears more focused on the act of inflicting harm. Even so, this logic appears to be somewhat tautological, however, and not empirically testable. If harm is also adopted as a potential goal of economic sanctions, then success will be assured, whether or not reform of policy is achieved then there can be no degree of failure. In other words, the theory proposed by Nossal appears to suffer from a lack of falsifiability. Therefore, since the argument espoused by Nossal is a tautology, her theory cannot be accepted. This article serves as corroboration that while there is conceptual agreement over what comprises a sanction, economic or otherwise, there is disharmony in the field over what can be considered and measured as a successful sanction. The work of Nossal highlights that researchers are actively working to establish an accepted definition of a victory of the sanctioning process.

The Efficacy and Unintended Consequences of Economic Sanctions

While it is possible that there is an implicit desire of the policy-initiator to inflict a deep and personal harm upon the recipient of an economic sanction, it seems more likely that there is a policy outcome that is desired instead.

95. Nossal 1989, 322.

Researchers look to see under what conditions economic sanctions can be expected to work.^{96 97 98 99 100 101} Two different interpretations of a successful sanction are offered in the literature. First, there is a direct success in which the clearly outlined goals and motives of the sanction are achieved via planned mechanisms. Second, sanctions might be considered indirectly successful where the explicit goals are not obtained, however, other more nebulous goals are obtained and achieved.

These researchers tend to examine the economic, social, and political pressure upon the political leadership of a target regime which will result from the sanctioning process. Ang and Peksen offer an understanding of economic sanctions which focuses upon the salience of issues to both the issuing and the target regime. The hypotheses which they test are actually quite simple at an intuitive level. The likelihood of the success of a sanction is determined by the issue's importance from the perspective regime. If an issuing regime deems an issue important it is likely to endeavor to see that the policy or behavior is changed to more closely align with their desired status, thereby increasing the probability of a successful outcome. Likewise, if a target regime holds an issue as

96. Ang and Peksen 2007.

97. Bartilow 2001.

98. Hart Jr. 2000.

99. Lindsay 1986.

100. Gibbons 1999.

101. Nikolay Marinov, "Do Economic Sanctions Destabilize Country Leaders?," *American Journal of Political Science*, 49.3 (2005).

especially important it will adamantly resist despite the sanction, thus lowering the likelihood of sanction success.¹⁰² Marinov concludes that sanctions are successful, in that they destabilize the leaders of nations which have been targeted, yet the degree of destabilization is contingent upon the severity of the sanction and the domestic factors such as resources, and the health of the national economy.¹⁰³ He finds that leaders whose nations have been subject to sanctions are more likely to be removed from power and replaced. Subsequently, upon the arrival of new leadership, the sanctions tend to be lifted.¹⁰⁴ Much like the research by Ang and Peksen, and to some degree Bartilow, Marinov does account for issue salience by arguing that leaders self-select themselves into sanction groups.¹⁰⁵ Leaders of states such as North Korea, Iraq (under Saddam Hussein), and Cuba, will ignore sanctions because they deem the reasons for the sanctions as more important than the sanctions themselves. The issue of selection effects highlights the importance of establishing a good measure to observe economic sanctions. If a regime is averse to being the target of a sanction for any reason it might capitulate at the mere threat or whisper of a sanction. If, however, a sanction is issued it might be that the target of the sanction considers the issue to be salient and will resist as much as possible, thus, lowering the effect of sanctions which are presented in the data. Selection effects in measuring

102. Ang and Peksen 2007, 138-139.

103. Marinov 2005, 572.

104. Ibid., 574.

105. Ibid., 574.

economic sanctions could cause a bias, which if not accounted for could present misleading results.

There does not seem to be any considerable, or vigorous debate over what is meant by scholars when they refer to economic sanctions. Sanctions, as shown through the research of Bartilow can be defined as coercive diplomacy where the goal of the issuing state is to achieve a specific goal ranging from the abandonment of a certain policy to the removal of political leadership.¹⁰⁶ Much of the debate arises when discussing why the sanctions were imposed upon a target, and whether they are successful in achieving their goals. Sanctions, as described in detail above, can be described as the implementation of a policy which is intended to coerce the target state or regime to alter its behavior or policies in some manner which is desired by the issuer of the sanctions.^{107 108 109}

106. Bartilow 2001, 117-119.

107. Adeno Addis, "Economic Sanctions and the Problem of Evil," *Human Rights Quarterly*, 25.3 (2003).

108. Ang and Peksen 2007.

109. Hart Jr. 2000.

110 111 112 113 114 115 116 Adeno Addis presented an interesting argument in his article in *Human Rights Quarterly*, that the modification of behavior cannot be understood as the only intention of state imposing economic sanctions upon a target regime. While coercing a target to alter behavior or policies is an important motivation behind the issuance of sanctions, leaders will also issue sanctions to distance their states from the “evil” which they associate with the target of the sanctions. While Addis primarily focuses on the sanctions imposed by the United Nations Security Council this argument can be easily related to any state which is issuing sanctions upon a target. Addis further warns that those who are issuing sanctions as a mechanism to distance themselves from what they deem as unacceptable actions from a particular regime run the risk of falling into the trap of exerting an “evil” influence themselves.¹¹⁷ It can be inferred from his argument that the sanctions which are imposed can actually be detrimental to the well-being of the population of the target state. As Addis describes it, “the nature of the international community appears to resemble a drum (if you hit it on one

110. David J. Lektzian and Christopher M. Sprecher, “Sanctions, Signals and Militarized Conflict,” *American Journal of Political Science*, 66.1 (2007).

111. Nossal 1989.

112. Marinov 2005.

113. Dursun Peksen, “Better or Worse? The Effect of Economic Sanctions on Human Rights,” *Journal of Peace Research*, 46.1 (2009).

114. Bartilow 2001.

115. Gibbons 1999.

116. Steven C. Poe, “Human Rights and Economic Aid Allocation Under Ronald Reagan and Jimmy Carter,” *American Journal of Political Science*, 36.1 (1992).

117. Addis 2003, 597.

end, the whole thing vibrates).”¹¹⁸ The message is clear that the action of sanctioning will have ramifications not only for the target regime, but those within the population of the state, and even those regimes and populations which are near to the state which is being sanctioned. Just as the waves of vibration move outward, so too will the waves created by the action of imposing an economic sanction.

Conclusion

Analyzing literature and previous research into economic sanctions has exhibited that this concept is deceptively complex. The notion that a sanction is a mere act of “coercive diplomacy” is a vast understatement. Contained within the concept of economic sanctions are numerous issues which if not accounted for will clearly impact the conclusions which are obtained. For example, whether democratic nations in a dyad with a fellow democracy are averse to having an economic sanction leveled upon them and whether the mere whisper or threat of a sanction is sufficient to create a desired change can significantly bias the obtained conclusions. Also, it would be expected that nations which share higher levels of trade will be more averse to the notion of issuing economic sanctions against their trading partners due to the costs which they would be imposing on themselves.

118. Ibid., 601.

All of these issues can bias and obscure the true relationship between sanctions and human rights, or other variables, which are actually occurring in reality.

CHAPTER FOUR

ERECTING REPRESENTATION: POTENTIAL AND PERILS FOR DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE

Introduction

Following the invasion of Iraq by the United States in 2003 and the return of national sovereignty to the people of Iraq in June of the following year, the first national elections were set to follow shortly thereafter. On Election Day in January of 2005, men and women proudly displayed the purple ink on their fingers that signified that they had cast their ballot during the first elections held within Iraq in the post-Saddam Hussein era. The 2005 Iraqi parliamentary elections were watched around the world and the process was touted as initial evidence of a blossoming democratic system within the former autocratically governed nation. Elections served as a powerful and significant indicator that democracy was taking root within the re-forming Iraqi state. Indeed, elections are often cited as one of the main facets of a democratic system and their importance to the legitimacy and integrity of a democratic government have been the source of many inquiries. Although democracy and elections are often viewed as being mutually dependent on one another, there are a number of ways in which democracy can operate in a genuinely undemocratic manner. First, many regimes that are autocratic engage in the process of holding elections. Similarly, in many

states ethnic cleavages can inhibit the democratic quality of elections that are held.

In order to establish the theoretical significance of the relationship that is shared between democracy and elections it is necessary to first establish the conceptual definition and criteria of a democratic state. Second, it is proper to consider the steps that must be made by nations to transition into a democratic system of governance or to strengthen their democratic institutions. Third, it is essential to give consideration to the steps in the process of democratic transition. Are elections a process that is sufficient for a state to be democratic or are there other necessary aspects that must be in place? Finally, the literature must be analyzed to draw out lingering non-democratic tendencies that persist within democracies and how they impact the governing system of the citizenry. By drawing each of these areas together, a more complete mosaic of democratic government can be exhibited. In understanding what is necessary and sufficient for democracy to develop, function and flourish within a state one can then examine the conditions that lead to failures of democratic governance and their ramifications. Completing the portrait of democracy, and its potential shortcomings and non-democratic tendencies offers perspective on the manner in which human rights abuses can creep into the political culture of a democratic state facing an economic threat.

The Requisites for Democracy

First, it is essential to commence with a discussion of what is required for a democracy to exist. Seymour Martin Lipset presents an analysis of the nature of democracy by accessing the conditions which he maintains are required for the stability and maintenance of democracy. Lipset begins by explaining precisely why it is important to uncover the conditions which are conducive to democracy within a nation and he provides a conceptual definition for democracy, at least in complex societies. Democracy, according to Lipset is, “a political system which supplies regular constitutional opportunities for changing the governing officials.”¹¹⁹ At its root then, democracy can be viewed as a system in which there is a legal precedent for a change in power of the government. This does not mean, according to Lipset, that there must be a change in political power for a nation to be deemed a democracy. Rather, there must only be the chance that the process of power transition be undertaken. Opportunity arises through the process of some form of election in which individuals or parties vie for power and rely on mass public support to obtain their goal.

In his analysis, Lipset divides the nations studied into two distinct sets, European and English-speaking nations and Latin American nations. Further, he employs two separate criteria to determine which of the nations in these groups

119. Seymour Martin Lipset, “Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy,” *American Political Science Review*. 53.1 (1959): 71.

are categorized as democracies. Democracies in the context of European and English speaking nations can be identified through the, “uninterrupted continuation of political democracy since World War I, and the absence over the past 25 years of a major political movement opposed to the democratic ‘rules of the game.’”¹²⁰ Latin American nations, by contrast, are merely determined through whether a, “given country has had a history of more or less free elections for most of the post-World War I period.”¹²¹ The criterion for democracy in the latter is definitely more lax. Nations in the Latin American category only need have had some semblance of elections in the past. Election history need not be sustained or regular in these cases, but only occupying a majority of the nation’s modern history at the time.

Lipset moves further and discusses what he argues are requisite conditions in a nation for democracy to flourish. These conditions are also divided into two groups, conditions which concern economic development and those which deal with legitimacy. Most important, these conditions apply to all democracies, whether they are European or Latin American democracies. The conditions serve as generalizable expectations to all democratic vitality. Lipset offers the hypothesis that greater levels of economic development and prosperity are related to higher levels of democracy in a nation. Specifically, Lipset incorporates

120. Ibid., 73.

121. Ibid., 74.

income, level of urbanization, and education in the hypotheses which concern the economic requisite conditions of democracy. Lipset also attempts to show that there is a correlation between higher levels of economic development and higher levels of democracy, as he chose to divide the nations into different groups.¹²² Greater wealth within a nation has many benefits for states as a whole. Wealthier nations are more willing to accept and adopt democratic norms and values, distinctions of class within the nation, and to seek the reduction of nepotism in policies.¹²³ Further, greater levels of wealth in a nation is also important in changing the shape of the social structure from a pyramid with a narrow upper class, to a diamond shaped structure where the middle class is the most prominent.¹²⁴

Finally, Lipset turns his focus toward the conditions of democracy which are associated with legitimacy. Legitimacy can be achieved or maintained through a number of processes or events. For example, as a nation is transitioning toward democracy, the legitimacy of the democracy can be bolstered through the support and continuity of existing social institutions. Also, legitimacy can be strengthened by the determination of when new groups are allowed to enter into the political process. Therefore, if the electoral system of a nation is allowed to become increasingly competitive with the acceptance of new parties and groups,

122. Ibid., 76.

123. Ibid., 83-84.

124. Ibid. 83.

then it is more likely that people will view the democracy as legitimate rather than a farce. Finally, Lipset maintains that if a system remains stable for a long period of time, that the legitimacy of democracy in that system is increased and strengthened. He fails to give a period of time but cites the United States and Switzerland as examples to corroborate this argument.

According to Lipset then, democracies are characterized by an environment that is conducive to the development of a middle class and more importantly through the establishment of institutions that are widely recognized as legitimate. Individuals occupying the middle class seek to ensure their interests through representation in the political system because they numerically represent the majority of the economic structure. They reward political moderation and counter the power of political elites. Legitimacy is obtained by the allowance of different segments of the population to engage in suffrage rather than fight their way into the political arena.¹²⁵ By barring one segment of the population from the political arena, more extremist policy preferences develop within the ostracized group. If entry is granted by some means at a later point, they will tend to have unrealistic expectations about what political involvement can provide, and therefore, view the system as illegitimate.¹²⁶ Legitimacy, then, is clearly related to the electoral process in a democracy, and fostering an illegitimate system has

125. Ibid., 88-89.

126. Ibid., 89.

potential repercussions to the success and longevity of a democratic nation according to Lipset.

Przeworski et al. arrive at a similar conclusion to that of Lipset with respect to the relationship between wealth and democracy. After running a large number of statistical tests, and producing what they refer to as a, “forest of numbers,” the authors arrive at a number of central findings which should be addressed. First, wealth and prosperity does not lead to democracy or facilitate the development of this type of governance. Instead, the level of wealth of a nation is tied to the stability of the democracy.¹²⁷ Thus, they state that, “In every aspect we have examined, the differences between poor and rich countries have been enormous. For one, even if democracies do occasionally spring up in poor countries, they are extremely fragile when facing poverty, whereas in wealthy countries they are impregnable.”¹²⁸

In contrast, Foweraker and Landman have asserted that there is a connection between democratic performance and the level of economic development that a country has experienced. More specifically, the level of economic development within a country has been shown to have a positive and statistically significant impact upon the performance of democratic features of a

127. Adam Przeworski, Michael Alvarez, Jose Antonio Cheibub and Fernando Limongi, *Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 136-137.

128. Przeworski, et al., 269.

nation.¹²⁹ Therefore, according to Foweraker and Landman, democratic function and performance could be enhanced and heightened by increased economic development. In either theoretical approach, democracy and the economy have been shown to be intertwined.

Movement Toward More Democratic Governments?

The path toward democratization is a process. Recent history is marked by periods in which numerous countries in all regions of the globe began the process of adopting democracy as a form of government. First, consideration will be given for the massive amount of democratization that has occurred in Africa. In terms of transition, Africa has been amongst the forefront of regions that have made attempts to embrace democraticness. Second, the transition paradigm is to be considered along with the deficiencies that are inherent within the paradigm. These following sections offer a case and consideration for the principles at work within the process of democratic transition.

Gyimah-Boadi presents a historical account of the movement of nations in Africa toward democratic tendencies. According to Gyimah-Boadi, African nations have experienced a wave of “redemocraticization” which has significantly altered the political landscape in Africa in the last decade. Gyimah-Boadi notes

129. Joe Foweraker and Todd Landman, “Economic Development and Democracy Revisited: Why Dependency Theory is Not Yet Dead,” *Democratization* 11.1 (2004): 18.

five manners in which African nations have developed toward democracy and away from the legacy of authoritarianism. First, many nations have rejected their former constitutions which aided in the enforcement of authoritarian tendencies, and have adopted new constitutions which are more democratic in nature than their earlier counterparts. Elections have been held in many African nations which are genuinely competitive. More importantly, in many instances incumbent leaders who find themselves on the losing side of the vote count are relinquishing power. Second, there has been a considerable surge in the availability of independent media in the form of television, radio, and in print. Further, according to Gymiah-Boadi, the openness and availability of the media has helped to further the movement of these nations to more democratic tendencies. Third, connected to the idea of a free and developing media is the establishment of a flourishing civil society. As people are becoming more informed, they are able to influence the direction of their state by holding their government accountable and remain relevant unlike those civil societies which were present in the immediate wake of independence. Next, as the “second liberation” has washed over the continent of Africa, there has been rejuvenation in the prominence and prestige of parliaments. These bodies are working to keep the other branches of government in check and not revert to the practice of serving the whims of the executive of the state. Finally, there has been an increasing awareness of the legacy of corruption by those in power which followed the process of independence of African nations. Groups have formed with the purpose of exposing corruption. The development

of these groups is connected to the establishment of a civil society, new constitutions, and the burgeoning media outlets in Africa.

Gyimah-Boadi quickly curtails the optimistic outlook which is being presented and highlights the many deficiencies of the African shift toward democratization. First, the move toward democracy has not been experienced evenly by all nations, and many of those nations which were moving forward have either stopped moving toward democracy or have undergone a reversal of policy. Next, both the parliaments and the constitutions which have hindered the prospect of authoritarianism are also under the threat of reversal in some nations where leaders have been able to maintain control over the nation. Finally, there is the dilemma of weak parties which are still not responsive to their constituents but instead to those at the head of the parties. Gyimah-Boadi identifies this as democratic transition, but not consolidation.¹³⁰ Further, these problems are not inherently African, but are instead typical of “immature” democracies.¹³¹ Gyimah-Boadi concludes with an assessment of four challenges which exhibit how African nations are responding to issues given their democratic reforms which they have undergone in recent years. These challenges include: state building, the AIDS virus which has deeply afflicted the African continent, civil-military relations, and citizenship.

130. E. Gyimah-Boadi, *Democratic Reform in Africa: The Quality of Progress* (Boulder: Lynne Rienne, 2004), 12.

131. *Ibid.*, 13.

With respect to state building and the AIDS virus, the democratic reforms have established a more open culture, nations are attempting to rebuild their economies through neo-liberal economic strategies, and the openness of African society has brought international aid to help with the spread of AIDS. Likewise, there has been a reduction in the military in many African nations, and as a result, a reduction in the coup d'états. Finally, national and civic ties are replacing the ties of ethnicity in Africa, furthering the development of the private sector and civil society in Africa.¹³² It must be noted that Gyimah-Boadi tempered every comment about success with reasons why transitions have not been entirely successful or how they could potentially be reversed by old practices.

In a rather straightforward argument, Thomas Carothers addresses what he perceives as the fallacy of the current paradigm which dominates the academic understanding of democratic transitions. With the onset of the third wave of democratization which began in the 1990s the transition model which was used to explain this trend reached paradigm status, and was accepted as universal.¹³³ There are five core assumptions which define the transition paradigm. First, and most generally, any nation which moving away from a dictatorship is inherently moving toward democratic governance and should be considered in the process of democratic transition. The second assumption maintains that there is an

132. Ibid., 21.

133. Thomas Carothers, "The End of the Transition Paradigm," *Journal of Democracy*, 13.1 (2002), 6.

identifiable sequence of events which constitute the transition process beginning with the opening, then progressing to the breakthrough, and finally culminating in consolidation. The third assumption asserts that elections are vital for the foundation of democratic ideals, and the generation of further democratic values. The fourth assumption is that all nations can make the transition to democracy despite their cultural, economic, or political legacies. In essence, the importance of these factors was downplayed in favor of analyzing the decision of political leaders to move toward democracy.¹³⁴ The final assumption of the transition paradigm states that the “democratic transitions making up the third wave are being built on coherent, functioning states.”¹³⁵ In other words, the process of transitioning is establishing new institutions in these states.

The majority of Carother’s article is not spent praising the transition paradigm, but rather explaining what he views as its short-comings and deficiencies which appear when comparing the paradigm to the light of the empirical and historical record. Carothers notes that the historical record does not corroborate the transitional paradigm. According to Carothers, “Of the nearly 100 countries considered as ‘transitional’ in recent years, only a relatively small number—probably fewer than 20—are clearly en route to becoming successful, well-functioning democracies or at least have made some democratic progress and

134. Ibid., 8.

135. Ibid., 8.

still enjoy a positive dynamic of democratization.”¹³⁶ Instead, many nations are not dictatorships and are not moving toward democracy but are in a political gray zone. Though there are many terms which can be used to describe the plethora of nations which occupy this gray zone Carothers condenses these nations into two categories, feckless pluralism and dominant-power politics. Feckless pluralism are nations which exhibit transition of power but the participation of the public into politics is largely limited to voting and the political elite are still corrupt. Democracy is essentially a façade and is only an ideal, but not realized. Dominant-power politics are systems in which the leadership is dominated by a specific group, which can be a family, individual, party, or movement.¹³⁷

Democratic Authoritarianism?

According to the criteria for democracy espoused by Lipset, elections are what qualify a nation to be considered a democracy. Elections are often argued to be one of the primary prerequisites for a state to be considered fully democratic. In North American and European democracies, which are established and consolidated democratic states, there must be no challenges to the, “democratic ‘rules of the game.’”¹³⁸ Within these democracies, the rules of the game are the constitutional requirements for the regular opportunity to change leadership through elections. Therefore, there to be considered democratic, there must be no

136. Ibid., 9.

137. Ibid., 11-12.

138. Lipset, 73.

threat to usurp the constitutional provisions that ensure elected representation. Within Latin American, or transitioning governments, elections and the integrity of the elections are still essential to determine whether a government should be categorized as a democracy. To say that a nation that holds elections is democratic is not a sufficient criterion for democratic distinction. Nations that are obviously not democratic often employ elections. These states are recognized as not having either the capacity or the willingness to institute completely free or fair elections that are not influenced by persisting authoritarian legacies.

In the wake of the Cold War, scholars began to analyze and discuss electoral authoritarianism. With the United States standing alone as the lone superpower in the world after the collapse of the Soviet Union, states that had once been dependent on the Soviets for resources, protection and aid now saw their fortunes placed in the will of the United States. In an attempt to ally themselves closer to the West many states began to entertain a shift toward more liberal policies.¹³⁹ These so-called hybrid regimes occupied a somewhat gray area on the continuum between democracy at one end and autocracy on the other end. They were not necessarily utterly autocratic due to some attempts to liberalize, yet leaders recognized that elections could serve as window dressing to

139. Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, *Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 17.

the rest of the world, particularly the United States, and thereby legitimize the regime in power.¹⁴⁰

Further, in moving from an authoritarian regime toward a democratic state, the former leadership of these nations are often not held formally accountable for their human rights oppressions which occurred while power was consolidated unilaterally. According to Todd Landman, “Democracy is founded on the set of principles and ideas ... but it is often the product of political accommodation at key moments in a country’s history and associated with notions of balance, possibility and working towards agreeable and peaceful solutions to conflicts of interest.”¹⁴¹ In many instances, it is advantageous for the democratic process to move forward in the implementation of democratic tendencies and not to exacerbate historical tensions. There is also the distinct possibility that it is the authoritarian figure who is personally opening the government of the nation to the possibility of democratic reform. In that sort of circumstance, the ability or the willingness to face accountability for past human rights transgressions will be low. In this respect, democracy is disjointed and separate from human rights ideals. Although it is considered nearly axiomatic that democracies are superior to autocracies with respect to human rights recognition, of all types, here is a potential area in which democracies themselves

140. Ibid., 19.

141. Todd Landman, *Human Rights and Democracy: The Precarious Triumph of Ideals* (New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2013), 40.

can fall short of the goals and levels that have been historically established and internationally accepted.

The Impact of Culture and Ethnicity on Elections

Going back to the example mentioned in the introduction of this paper, parliamentary elections within Iraq in 2005 also highlight one of the more pressing and nagging issues relating to electoral politics within democracies: the role and power of ethnicity and various ethnic group interests in casting votes. Iraq, like many other states, contains distinct ethnic groups which view themselves and their interests as distinct. Within Iraq, a clear distinction appeared between the voter turnout of Sunni and Shia groups. The elections occurred with only a small portion of Iraqi Sunnis casting their vote. Harkening back to the criteria for a democracy established by Lipset, the legitimacy of the election was severely dampened by the low turnout of this prominent ethnic group. Ethnic cleavages in electoral politics are deeply entrenched in many states and their prominence in the election system is often a feature of developing or weak democracies.

Ethnicity is clearly a salient force within politics. Chandra offers an insightful perspective into the electoral operations of India and how individuals shape their votes. India, although a democracy, is a prime example of a patronage-democracy where the state possesses jobs and resources within the system and is able to distribute these valuable commodities to those deemed

deserving.¹⁴² Because of the nature of the democracy which India possesses, voters see a major benefit in voting for individuals from their ethnic groups. Members of an ethnic group will work to ensure that the distribution of state allocated goods and services benefit the ethnic group which they represent over others within the electorate. Voters then make the decision to “count heads” within their ethnic party to determine whether their preferred party has a chance at victory in the polls. If there is not sufficient support, then individuals will not vote for their preferred party choice. Even if one prefers one party over another, if there is not enough support to get that party past the winning threshold, then voters look elsewhere to cast their support.

Ethnicity can also have a much more sinister relationship with elections and party promises. In areas where ethnic cleavages have violent tendencies, such as in India, leaders can use protection from violence as an electoral tool. In India, Hindu-Muslim relations are extraordinarily tense and often lead to riots and acts of mass violence. In areas where the party competition is not especially strong, there is no need for parties to vie for the support of minority groups such as Muslims and Christians. As such, there is no incentive to offer state protection for these groups in the case of riots and ethnic conflict. If the electoral competition is fierce rather than minimal, Muslims can use their electoral significance to ensure

142. Kanchan Chandra, *Why Ethnic Parties Succeed: Patronage and Ethnic Head Counts in India* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 6-8.

that leaders recognize their security.¹⁴³ Most significant from this analysis is the conclusion that competitive elections are not only requisite for democracy as argued by other scholars,^{144 145} but that the competitiveness of elections is also conducive to human security guarantees from the government. Competitive elections not only ensure the vitality of democratic values, but also the protection of groups against violence.

In contrast to the arguments presented by Chandra and also Wilkinson which argue that ethnicity and culture impact voter turnout and choice, Jackman and Miller seek to further the body of comparative body of literature by examining and testing two competing theories which offer an explanation of voter turnout in industrialized democracies. The first of these competing theories insists that it is institutions, not ethnicity or culture, which influences voter turnout. The second theory, on the other hand, asserts that it is culture which is responsible for voter turnout and not institutions. They extend a previous dataset used by Jackman to analyze the effect of institutions on voter turnout. The original data set used by Jackman included 19 cases and focused on the years 1960-1980. Their expansion to the data includes adding three significant cases, Greece, Portugal, and Spain; and they also extend the time period of the data outward, including

143. Steven I. Wilkinson, *Votes and Violence: Electoral Competition and Ethnic Riots in India* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 155-164.

144. Staffan I. Lindberg, *Democracy and Elections in Africa* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006).

145. Lipset 1959.

cases up to the year 1990. These three cases are important to the sample because they are newly formed democracies with authoritarian histories, and as such, can be used to provide evidence for one theoretical argument over the other. If the cultural theory is explaining voter turnout, then it would be expected that voter turnout in these three nations would be low. If it is institutions which explains voter turnout then the turnout should be higher.¹⁴⁶

Jackman and Miller then cite five institutional factors which influence voter turnout. The first factor is nationally competitive elections. The more nationally competitive the districts within a nation, the higher the rate of voter turnout is expected to be. The second factor is electoral proportionality. Since higher disproportionality in systems are likely to make many feel like they are wasting their vote by casting it for a minority party. Thus, the higher the proportionality in the nation, the higher the expected voter turnout. Third, the number of parties is also important. A system with many parties which form coalitions can lower turnout because voters feel disconnected from the government which is established. Fourth, unicameralism is expected to boost turnout since there is more legislative decisiveness associated with this system. Finally, mandatory voting laws are assessed. Since there are often no real penalties associated with these laws, it is not expected that these laws will

146. Robert Jackman and Ross Miller, "Voter Turnout in the Industrial Democracies During the 1980's," *Comparative Political Studies*, 27.4 (1995).

significantly influence voter turnout. The authors implement a statistical model to test the two divergent theories, and find that it is the institutional model which most adequately explains the turnout trend which is occurring in industrialized democracies. Further, the institutional theory explains the three additional cases which had authoritarian pasts better than the cultural theoretical explanation.

Elections as Steps in a Process

Thus far, it has been shown how elections can be used in an undemocratic manner. Authoritarian leaders can manipulate and respond to violence to serve their electoral needs.¹⁴⁷ In a similar manner, authoritarian leaders might use undemocratic elections as a form of window dressing to accommodate Western preferences and obtain international legitimacy for the current regime.^{148 149} These arguments would lead one to believe that while there is little hope for democracy to truly consolidate in these transitioning cases. After all, if the status quo of holding uncompetitive elections is sufficient for obtaining international and domestic goals there is no incentive to change course and liberalize beyond a minimal threshold. Democratic transition in these cases would seem to be stymied with little hope of progressing further toward democratic consolidation.

147. Wilkinson 2004.

148. Levitsky and Way 2010.

149. Beatriz Magaloni, *Voting for Autocracy: Hegemonic Party Survival and Its Demise in Mexico* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

Electoral authoritarianism could be the end of the road toward transition for many cases.^{150 151}

On the contrary, elections and the process of electoral competition can be conducive for the advancement of a government toward democratic values. According to Lindberg, the actual process of holding elections cycles actually aids in the engraining of democratic tendencies and liberal ideals within the society. As a state undertakes the election process, even though the process may be flawed and not completely democratic, liberal norms and values are engrained into the society. Within African cases, which comprise the breadth of Lindberg's case set, once the third electoral cycle occurs in a state, the likelihood of regime breakdown and regression into authoritarianism is extremely low.¹⁵² Thus, while initial steps that nations adopt through the offering of elections might be miniscule the process of holding uninterrupted competitive elections serves to improve the quality of democracy within a state.

Lindberg's conclusions, while promising about the prospects of spreading and strengthening democratic norms, are obviously not deterministic. In many nations repeated iterations serves to enhance the democratic values within a society. Yet, in some nations within his African sample, the nation did experience electoral cycles without improving the quality of democratic norms. Cases such

150. Levitsky and Way 2010, 340.

151. Lindberg 2006, 3.

152. Ibid., 3.

as Sudan, Togo, and Chad highlight this phenomenon because they had “founding elections” but competitive elections were eventually eliminated.¹⁵³ Thus, while Lindberg argues that elections serve to reinforce democratic values, it must be remembered that there are still cases which remain in the gray zone of polity, existing as a hybrid regime.

Democracy and elections share a distinct relationship. It can be said that elections are a necessary but not a sufficient condition for democracy within a state. States engaged in regime transition that are moving toward democracy but still retain many of their politically repressive autocratic features can, and have, held elections. These elections are not free and fair, and the process can hardly be considered completely democratic.¹⁵⁴ Elections can be influenced by ethnic influences and interests,^{155 156} and can also be structured undemocratically.^{157 158} Yet, these elections need not be judged as isolated cases but rather as steps in a process toward true democracy. As argued by Lindberg, elections offer states the chance to learn about the democratic process and to refine their politics toward a more representative status quo. Even if authoritarian legacies or ethnic clientelistic tendencies persist immediately following the decision to hold national

153. Ibid., 74-75.

154. Levitsky and Way 2010.

155. Chandra 2004.

156. Wilkinson 2004.

157. Levitsky and Way 2010.

158. Magaloni 2006.

elections, the process of elections offers a chance for values to be learned and institutionalized. Thus, even though aspects of the election might be completely undemocratic and illegitimate, the eventual outcome can be liberalization and democratic consolidation over time.

The relationship between democracy and elections appears deeper rather than superficial. It is not correct to merely purport that a democracy is achieved through the holding of free and fair elections. Instead, it would be wise to frame the relationship between elections and democracy as conducive where exercise in one area, the process of elections, leads to strengthening in the other, liberalization and embracement of democratic values. Framing democracy and elections in this manner offers an optimistic perspective for those hybrid regimes beginning the journey toward democratization yet retaining many authoritarian tendencies. With time and repeated election iterations, democracy can be achieved and consolidated even in situations where elections are currently not free or fair. Therefore, in the example of Iraq, and the 2005 parliamentary elections, while the founding election was pivotal, more might be explained about the successfulness of democracy in this country by examining following election cycles.

A More Nuanced Understanding of Democracies

Prevalent within the field of political science is the trend to dichotomize the type of government within a nation into categories determined by whether a

government is either an autocracy or democracy. Attempts to incorporate a more representative measure into studies often involve the polity score of a state. This measurement, while offering a greater degree of variation than a dichotomous measurement still does not offer examination into the intricacies of the institutional composition of a state. By relying on a minimalistic classification scheme such as authoritarian and democratic, one is potentially suggesting that there is no importance in the composition of the democratic or authoritarian institutional structure of a state's government. Research in this line begs the question: are all democracies created equal? Does institutional structure matter within democratic nations for the operation of politics, or can political processes be better explained by other features unrelated to institutions? This paper will address some of the ways that differences in institutional composition has been theoretically argued to affect political outcomes.

To Represent All, or to Represent a Majority?

All democracies do not operate in an identical fashion. Differences present themselves within the case of each democratic nation. At the most basic and recognizable level, democracies can be distinguished between presidential and parliamentary legislative systems. First, democratic governments might be described as presidential systems. Presidential democracies are systems in which the government is run by an executive who is not responsible to an elected assembly and cannot be removed from office outside of election or malfeasance

of office.^{159 160} Second, governmental systems within democratic nations might also be characterized as parliamentary democracies. Parliamentary democracies contain a legislative body which is above the executive, and where the power of the government is derived through coalition building and compromise between political parties to formulate a legislative majority.¹⁶¹

Even with the dissection of democratic structures into presidential and parliamentary categories, some important differences remain which are crucial to the operation of politics within countries. Further differentiation between democratic institutions is possible, and offers a great deal of information about governmental features and the practice of politics within nations. Arendt Lijphart, in his seminal study of thirty-six democracies around the world distinguishes between two models of democracy: the majoritarian, or Westminster model and the consensual model of democracy. Rather than merely assessing the legislative composition of a nation's government, the majoritarian—consensual cleavage can best be seen as a spectrum that incorporates a wide variety of institutional components.¹⁶² In fact, in his study, Lijphart designated only three cases as

159. Jose Antonio Cheibub, *Presidentialism, Parliamentarism and Democracy* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 33-42.

160. Irfan Noorudin, *Coalition Politics and Economic Development: Credibility and the Strength of Weak Governments* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 44-45.

161. Cheibub 2006, 35

162. Arend Lijphart, *Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999), 7.

relatively pure majoritarian democracies: the United Kingdom, New Zealand and Barbados; and only three cases as relatively pure consensus democracies: the European Union, Switzerland, and Belgium.¹⁶³ The majority of cases that were examined fell somewhere in between, having traits of both the majoritarian and consensual democratic models.

The Westminster model of democracy, is characterized by a leadership comprised within a winning majority coalition. This system has two parties where leaders are elected via a plurality method. Lijphart warns that in majority democracies, “Competition and conflict also characterize the majoritarian model’s typical interest group system: a system of free-for-all-pluralism.”¹⁶⁴ He continues, “Pluralism...means a multiplicity of interest groups that exert pressure on the government in an uncoordinated and competitive manner”¹⁶⁵ Here, the interests of minority groups is a process of conflict with the ruling majority party. In the most severe cases of majoritarian oppression of political interests and competition civil unrest, disillusionment, or even rebellion can erupt as was the case in Northern Ireland.¹⁶⁶

Democracies following the consensus model differ in that they are not systems where power is dominated by a bare majority coalition. Consensus democracy operates instead through disseminating power through sharing and

163. Ibid., 5-7.

164. Ibid., 16.

165. Ibid., 16.

166. Ibid., 32-33.

restraining processes.¹⁶⁷ Coalitions are formed with the awareness that the current majority could be the minority after the next election. Because of the fact that leaders in consensus democracies are cognizant of this fact, the processes of government are conducted in a manner that represent the interests of the entire population. Government is strongly decentralized and is organized federally. Likewise, electoral representation is proportional so that even smaller parties that would be excluded from government now have a voice in legislative matters.¹⁶⁸ Not surprisingly, these multiparty, proportional-representation systems are found to be more conducive to public welfare than democracies closer to the majoritarian model. Lijphart concluded his study with the determination that the consensus model of democracy was not statistically any worse at governance was typically “kinder and gentler” in its policies. Consensus models perform better at representing all in society, including women; they also have higher levels of political participation, and political equality.¹⁶⁹ As such, not only are consensus-oriented systems just as able to preserve peace according the Lijphart, they are more inclined to aid in human development and the realization of more idealistic democratic values.

Arguably, democracy works best within homogeneous societies where the interests and preferences of everyone can be adequately and equally represented

167. Ibid., 34.

168. Ibid., 34-41.

169. Ibid., 280-286.

in government. All societies are not homogenous and in many democracies there are cleavages that deeply divide the population. Can democracy flourish in these types of societies where there appears to be no alternative other than a system with winners and losers? Lijphart, in his seminal volume , *Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration*, advocates that yes, democracy can operate and flourish in plural societies. Stability can best be achieved through what Lijphart calls consociational democracy. This concept builds off of the consensus democratic model, but is applicable in segmented states, whereas consensus democracy can, and should be applied to all states. The primary component necessary for consociational democracy to operate within a society marked by a significant cleavage is a grand coalition in which all segments are represented.¹⁷⁰ Secondary requirements for consociational democracy to operate are that each minority group must have a mutual veto power; likewise, elections and civil service appointments should be proportional in nature so that all segments of society are equally included. Finally, federalism should be the standard so that each group in society has the autonomy to manage much of their affairs in a manner that ensures their groups interests.¹⁷¹ In attempting to engineer consociational democracy, a major requirement is that the government be

170. Arend Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), 25-31.

171. *Ibid.*, 41-44.

comprised in a parliament rather than a president and the government must also follow the consensual model.¹⁷²

Democratic Stability and Survival

Arguably, one of the most pressing questions related to the significance of different democratic institutional structures concerns the survivability rate of these governments. With the emphasis to promote and foster the development of democracy around the globe, it might not be sufficient to encourage more representative governmental structure. Instead, the institutional democratic format that is adopted might affect the long-term viability of the government. Presidential democratic electoral systems are often perceived as being rather brittle and fragile. In assessing the distinctions between parliamentary and presidential systems, it has been established that the overwhelming majority of stable established democracies in the world operate through parliamentary systems and that the only long-term success of a presidential democracy is contained in the case of the United States.¹⁷³ First, presidential ties to military heritage must be considered. Second, the analysis will move to the constitutional distinction between presidential and parliamentary systems. Third, the impetus of an exogenous shock on each of these systems will be assessed. Each of these ideas will help to form the theoretical distinctions between democratic states.

172. Ibid., 224.

173. Juan J. Linz, "The Perils of Presidentialism," *Journal of Democracy* 1.1 (Winter 1990): 51-52.

What then explains the distinct difference in the success rates between parliamentary and presidential democracies? The primary argument concerns the legacy of military dictatorship which is usually present within newly established presidential systems.^{174 175 176} Indeed, presidential systems might be particularly appealing in these nations since the citizens are accustomed to a strong central executive figure rather than a large legislative majority composed of coalitions and groups. Most scholars who study democratic electoral systems assert that presidential systems are more likely to revert into dictatorship if they fracture.¹⁷⁷
^{178 179 180 181} When there is a crisis in the government, it is extremely difficult, if not impossible to remove the president and attempt to establish a new government as is the case in a parliamentary system. During a crisis the only solution in a presidential system is to essentially ride out the period with the current leader at

174. Jose Antonio Cheibub, "Minority Governments, Deadlock Situations, and the Survival of Presidential Democracies," *Comparative Political Studies*, 35 (2002).

175. Cheibub 2006.

176. Alfred Stepan and Cindy Skach, "Constitutional Frameworks and Democratic Consolidation: Parliamentarism Versus Presidentialism," *World Politics*, 46 (1993).

177. Cheibub 2002.

178. Cheibub 2007.

179. Jose Antonio Cheibub and Fernando Limongi, "Democratic Institutions and Regime Survival: Parliamentarism and Presidentialism Reconsidered." *Annual Review of Political Science*, (2002).

180. Juan Linz and Arturo Valenzuela, *The Failure of Presidential Democracy: The Case of Latin America* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994).

181. Stepan and Skach 1993.

the helm of the nation.¹⁸² Thus, Stepan and Skach argue that, “Such situations often cause both the president and the opposition to seek military involvement to resolve the crisis in their favor.”¹⁸³ The president pushes the border of his delineated powers in an attempt to solve the issue and can, as a result erode the democratic values and processes which lifted them to power. Presidential systems have been shown to be more prone to collapse and reversion into dictatorial regimes.¹⁸⁴

This trait has been posited as arising through their constitutional framework which divides the powers into legislative and executive branches, and arguably more importantly, through the heritage of military dictatorship in which these fledgling democracies were conceived. Also, shocks to the economic or political system can lead elected presidents in transitioning democratic regimes to adopt policies which are much more repressive and undemocratic in nature. G. Bingham Powell wrote that “The price paid for pure executive stability is a substantial one. The security of a minority president can suddenly become the domination of a majority presidency. Majority presidents can even replace a democratic regime when they are threatened, as happened in the Philippines.”¹⁸⁵

182. Ibid., 19.

183. Ibid., 19.

184. G. Bingham Powell Jr., *Contemporary Democracies: Participation, Stability, and Violence*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982), 173-174.

185. Ibid., 219.

Democracy can be a tool utilized to implement the realization of undemocratic political outcomes.

Constitutional composition is essential to the integrity of democratic institutions. In a similar fashion to state constitutions within the United States, foreign democratic constitutions are more likely to be, “highly specific, to grant plenary rather than enumerated powers, to be amended or replaced frequently, and to be fairly unfamiliar to their publics.”¹⁸⁶ As such, elected officials are able to utilize constitutional features to aid in the creation of a situation that is conducive to their individual political prospects. Constitutions that are not entrenched can be amended to accommodate these goals, or worse, the public might be completely ignorant of legal provisions that can protect against political and legal overstepping by leadership.

Therefore, when an economic or political shock occurs and threatens the stability of a presidential democracy, a dramatic crisis is created in the nation. This crisis can arise in a number of ways. Leaders facing the crisis will potentially fear that oppositional segments within the population will seize an opportunity of perceived weakness in the regime and will present a threat to the ruling government. In an attempt to maintain their grasp over the political power

186. Mila Versteeg and Emily Zackin, “Constitutions Untrenched: Toward and Alternative Theory of Constitutional Design,” *American Political Science Review*, 110.4 (November 2016), 661.

of the nation, leaders will become undemocratic, instituting radical changes.¹⁸⁷ As the situation deepens, violence intensifies and democratic freedoms evaporate. For example, in many nations, elected leaders have appointed themselves as “president-for-life,” or at a minimum, simply outlawed serious electoral competition in an attempt to maintain their level of power.¹⁸⁸

By contrast, parliamentary systems are not expected to react to a crisis within the political system in the same way because it is more difficult for leaders in these systems to individually assume massive amounts of power. Parliamentary systems require minimal winning coalitions and dependence in the legitimacy of the established coalition for the government to effectively function.¹⁸⁹ ¹⁹⁰ Since one individual cannot easily assume unitary power, it is not likely for democratic tenets to be violated by a power-hungry individual or party. Indeed, anecdotal evidence appears to support this distinction between presidential and parliamentary systems.

Analyses have shown that parliamentarian systems have a higher rate of survival as compared to presidential counterparts. Why would it be the case that parliamentary systems live longer than presidential electoral systems? According to Cheibub, “for the 1946-2002 period, the expected life of a presidential

187. Ibid., 172.

188. Ibid., 173-174.

189. Irfan Noorudin, *Coalition Politics and Economic Development: Credibility and the Strength of Weak Governments* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).

190. Powell 1982.

democracy was 24 years versus 58 for parliamentary ones.”¹⁹¹ This point is also iterated in an earlier piece by Cheibub in which he states, “Indeed, existing evidence shows that parliamentary democracies tend to last longer than presidential democracies...The instability of presidential democracies has been commonly accounted for by the principle of separation between executive and legislative authorities.”¹⁹² Therefore, when a crisis or threat to power arise that places pressure on the leadership of a parliamentary democratic system, the leaders are constrained by the legislative power which is inherent in the system. It is less likely that one individual or even a group of people will be able to change the structure of the system and eliminate the “democraticness” from governmental processes.

Cheibub’s explanation for why nations previously ruled by military dictatorships tend to adopt presidential electoral systems is hardly satisfying. Instead of identifying the specific factors that led presidential systems to develop in states where military institutions were especially strong, he resigns and attributes this important phenomenon to luck, or as the case might be, misfortune. According to Cheibub, “My own view...is that the military—presidential nexus is the product of a historical accident: it exists because the countries where militarism remained strong at the middle of the twentieth century were also

191. Cheibub 2007, 136.

192. Cheibub 2002, 285.

countries that had adopted presidential institutions.”¹⁹³ Each of the previous discussions, first the military legacy of presidential regimes, second, the constitutional distinctiveness between parliamentary and presidential systems, and finally, the response to economic shocks in the system underpin the expected differences in democracies with their respect to human rights.

Institutions as a Source of Economic Growth and International Confidence
in Democracies

Governmental survival is obviously important for a multitude of reasons. One of the most crucial for success in a globalized and integrated world is the economic benefits that are derived by governmental and national stability. Nations that experience dramatic transitions to and from democracy are unlikely to be fertile ground for economic growth and international political and economic integration. First, the credibility of more plural or proportional systems is considered as a sign of international confidence in their system. Second, the constraints upon each system with respect to their credibility in the international system is considered.

Institutional composition is important for the economic prospects of democratic nations. Ronald Rogowski subdivides democracies into either plural or proportional electoral systems. Rogowski looks at the reasons why trade

193. Cheibub 2007, 23.

dependent states are typically proportional systems.¹⁹⁴ According to Rogowski, “Trade-dependent, advanced economies, which are likely in the first place to experience strong pressures for democratic participation, will find it advantageous to adopt democratic institutions that maximize the state’s insulation, autonomy, and stability.”¹⁹⁵ The states that best fit this model are ones that have proportional representation systems. Martin accomplishes a similar task by looking at both the United States and the European Union, and arrives at the conclusion that legislatures in advanced democracies are actually conducive to the promotion of economic cooperation and credibility. Legislatures do not relinquish the power to create agreements to the executive, but instead use their power to shape, limit, or prevent the agreement. Thus, because of their involvement in the formulation of agreements, the credibility of the international agreements is more substantial than those that are achieved when executives attempt to circumvent the domain of the legislature.

Similarly, Irfan Nooruddin makes a familiar case for why international actors would be more likely to invest in particular nations rather than others.¹⁹⁶ The presence of coalitions in democratic nations serves as a credible signal to different external actors. Nooruddin is confident in his conclusion that credible

194. Ronald Rogowski, “Political Cleavages and Changing Exposure to Trade,” *American Political Science Review*, 81.4 (1987), 206.

195. *Ibid.*, 212.

196. Noorudin 2011.

commitments spur economic growth.¹⁹⁷ International credibility is derived when there is no one actor or party in power that can unilaterally and arbitrarily alter policy. States where policy fluctuates grossly at the whims of one or a few are considered to have high levels of volatility and, therefore, lower levels of credibility.¹⁹⁸ Because investors cannot be certain that their investment in a volatile nation is a sound one, they are apprehensive about dedicating themselves fully. Governments with no constraints can change policy or reverse policy at will thereby stymieing economic growth. In nations where there is not an actor or party that is able to willfully manipulate the policy process, investors are more likely to see the political process as healthy and stable for greater investment.¹⁹⁹ Although presidential systems can provide stability when under conditions of divided government, or gridlock, it is parliamentary democracies that perform best and experience the highest levels of economic growth.²⁰⁰ This argument is similar but not identical to the one made by Lijphart. Lijpart argues that majoritarian systems, which are often perceived as being strong and stable, are not better at protecting either the economy or the civil peace within their borders.²⁰¹ For Nooruddin, the conclusions are clear. It is parliamentary democracies that are better able to develop institutional coalitions and constraints that provide political

197. Ibid. 103.

198. Ibid. 41-42.

199. Ibid. 57.

200. Ibid. 45-46.

201. Lijphart 1999, 274.

stability and, therefore, attract economic investment. Thus, Nooruddin expands on the argument of Lijphart by showing that parliamentary democracies are better economic alternatives than majoritarian or presidential democracies.

The Irrelevancy of Institutions: Clientelism in Africa

Contrary to the argument that the institutional composition of democratic states is crucial in understanding such political phenomenon as stability, growth, and state survival, there are counter-arguments which suggest that institutional structure is not as important as theorized. Instead, adherents of this view argue that it is some other feature in the system that can better explain the level that these national attributes assume. Within the study of African democracies in the last forty to fifty years since the end direct colonial rule, there is greater emphasis placed on cultural and familial factors than on the democratic institutions that newly organizing governments opt to adopt. Two strains of literature will be considered in this section. First, the propensity of patrimonialism and clientelism to infiltrate democratic politics. This has been especially true within Africa, which as discussed earlier, has been attempting to democratize. Second, there is the dependency argument, which dictates that stability is largely a legacy of colonialism. In this respect, much of the failure to consolidate democracy rests at the feet of Western powers.

In Africa especially, the coalition needed to maintain power is often argued as being manipulated through the practice of patronage politics rather than

consensual or majoritarian democratic structures. Schatzberg articulates the importance of clientelism in obtaining political support through the analogy of food and the importance of this to the people. Schatzberg mentions that, “Voters standing in line to cast their ballots were tempted with two slices of bread surrounding several ‘tasty’ banknotes if they agreed to vote the right way.”²⁰²

The lesson from this passage is clear, a sufficient winning coalition is often established in African nations through the distribution of goods such as food and even currency. Familial ties have also been used as an explanation for governmental policy outcomes within African nations. Although not exclusive to the African continent, there is a remarkable tendency for leaders in sub-Saharan African nations to portray their role in relation to the populous of the nation as a father-children relationship. Those who support the elected leader politically and more fervently are more likely to receive benefits and gifts from the father-like leader. Governmental appointments and civil service jobs are perks of a patrimonial relationship bestowed upon political loyalists. Clark C. Gibson discusses the economic role of wildlife in African nations as a source of clientelism.²⁰³ Africa has some of the most valuable and varied wildlife on the planet. As such, the hunting and protection of wildlife species is a valuable commodity. According to Gibson, not only is the practice of clientelism

202. Michael G. Schatzberg, *Political Legitimacy in Middle Africa: Father, Family, Food*, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001), 41.

203. Clark C. Gibson, *Politicians and Poachers: The Political Economy of Wildlife Policy in Africa* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

exercised through the distribution of licenses which allow certain privileged individuals to hunt these creatures, clientelism is also practiced through the appointment of certain individuals to jobs and positions within the bureaucratic structure.²⁰⁴ Government effectiveness in protecting these animals, and economically empowering certain individuals is a matter of party loyalty rather than proportionality as advocated by Lijphart.²⁰⁵

Rather than formatting democracy in a manner that is representative of the consensual will of all the people or simply a majority of the population, political outcomes are the product of patrimonial relationship of getting votes for services and positions within the government. Because of the prominence of clientelism and the power of presidents in African democracies, rare occurrences of institutional proceedings such as legislative elections and functions or presidential cabinet meetings come off purely as a matter of ritual and little more than a political “sideshow” that is played out for the public.²⁰⁶

Another prominent argument largely emanating from the African literature, but still applicable to much of the developing world, asserts that attributes such as economic growth rate, political stability and other outcomes are the product of European colonial heritage. Recall that Europeans desired to extract the wealth from their colonies and export the products to their European

204. Ibid., 35-36.

205. Lijphart 1977, 38-41.

206. Nicholas Van de Walle, “Presidentialism and Clientelism in Africa’s Emerging Party Systems,” *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 41.2 (2003), 310.

homeland. As a result of this legacy, Africans have not developed a strong manufacturing economy but have continued to export these products which can be controlled by a small group and can also be manipulated by certain groups to fund extended conflicts. It is more correct, the authors argue, to understand conflict as a result of economic structure and not as a product of other factors such as ideology.²⁰⁷

Although democratic qualities and values are often used to explain the outbreak of conflict and war some scholars have attributed this phenomenon to the enduring legacy of European colonization. Because primary commodities account for such a large share of Africa's economy, these resources can be subject to predation by rebel leaders or government officials and can be readily utilized to fund and sustain conflicts and wars.²⁰⁸ Therefore, the enclave economies which resulted because of the capitalistic tendencies and interests of former colonial powers are adversely affecting the African continent through the present. As posited by the World Bank, the authors assert that conflict deters foreign corporations from investing resources on the African continent. The motivations for this aversion are similar to the reasons provided by the World Bank in their research report. In nations which are conflict prone or there is a sufficient threat of conflict, supplies for production could be disrupted, or likewise, the finished

207. David K. Leonard and Scott Straus, *Africa's Stalled Development: International Causes and Cures* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003), 81-82.

208. *Ibid.*, 66.

manufactured product might not be able to reach the global market place. Similarly, it could be that corporations fear becoming associated with the conflict in the eyes of the public, thereby harming their profits. Leonard and Straus do offer some suggestions regarding policy which might help quell the potential for civil conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa. Their solution is that more developed and powerful nations offer their commitment to the regime and will protect it from any threat, foreign and domestic, as long as strides toward democracy are being made and human rights are observed.²⁰⁹ These types of commitments have shown potential in the past and they argue that if these commitments are extended, Africans will have greater autonomy to develop and truly be independent. While contentious, these two lines of thought impact the prospect for the success of democracy. That is, first, the tendency to implement cronyism and clientelism within democracy and, second, the inescapable legacy of Western colonialism.

Conclusion

Even when considering the theoretical and empirical arguments that maintain that institutions are largely irrelevant when compared to other factors, it is hard to dismiss distinct democratic institutions as the primary explanation for many political outcomes. Institutional composition matters and is a significant explanation for a wide variety of research questions from the kindness and gentleness of democracy, to the credibility of a state, to the probability of political

209. Ibid., 99.

survival of a government. What does seem fairly apparent is that consensual parliamentary systems offer better prospects for success and human well-being than presidential or majoritarian systems, and that the consociational model of democracy is beneficial and should be employed within fragmented or plural societies. According to Lijphart, one would expect that consensus democracies to not only have higher levels of democratic qualities than their Westminster counterparts, but also to be more interested in the social and economic welfare of their populations.²¹⁰ Nations that utilize a model of democracy closer to a consensus formulation are more in line with the liberal values that most attribute with ideal democracy. Finally, parliamentary democracies typically fare better than more presidential systems with respect to their stability and level of volatility.

Ultimately, there are still questions that remain unanswered and are theoretically relevant and pressing. Specifically, Cheibub identified a presidential—military nexus that influences the survival rate of presidential democracies. He does not, however, articulate the causes that lead presidential democracies to be more likely to develop in nations that have a strong military heritage. He believes that if it were parliamentary democratic systems that were chosen in these nations, that these systems would be just as likely to fail and collapse.²¹¹ This staggering trend encompassed within the presidential—military

210. Lijphart 1999, 294.

211. Cheibub 2007, 23.

nexus is theoretically and practically relevant and should be explored with greater fervor. Likewise, the theory of economic growth espoused by Nooruddin can be applied to many different theoretical questions. Where Nooruddin examines economic growth as his dependent variable, one could replace growth with military alliances, multilateral trade agreements or a host of other potential issues.²¹²

Research into the dynamics of democratic institutions still has a lot of ground to cover theoretically and empirically. More importantly, with the emphasis that the United States and other developed nations place on democratization, more emphasis should be placed on encouraging “smart democratization.” Rather than broadly pushing democracy, emphasis needs to be focused on democratic features, such as diffusing political power and building politically inclusive coalitions,^{213 214 215} which offer greater benefits to the general society and the durability of the government.²¹⁶

As highlighted throughout this chapter, the road toward democracy is not easily traversed. Movement toward democratic governance requires the active involvement of both individuals within civil society and the stewardship of governmental leaders. In that respect, it is insufficient to look at democracy as

212. Noorudin 2011.

213. Lijphart 1977.

214. Lijphart 1999.

215. Powell 1982.

216. Noorudin 2011.

either a bottom-up or a top-down phenomenon. Once democratic transition has occurred, recidivism is possible, and likely under certain parameters.²¹⁷ Certain non-democratic tendencies are apt to persist, especially when the power of an individual leader is threatened and they have the power to ensure that their office is safe through a variety of political mechanisms. Typically, this decision is unilateral, without the consent of the majority and other branches of the government are silenced in their opposition to the move. Theoretically, and historically, there are examples in which leaders have been inclined to use a carrot via patronage or clientelism to retain their office. Such an occurrence, while diverging from electoral purity and integrity, does not have the negative human cost of other options. In other cases, a stick might appear to be a more certain solution to solidify power and remove the threat of being ousted from office. As stated, presidential democracies, where there is consider power isolated in a single individual, are more prone to revert to authoritarian tendencies and to use the mechanisms of the state to curtail resistance to their leadership.

With the discussion over democracies and their features concluded, it is possible to synthesize the concepts discussed in the previous three chapters into a cohesive theory that combine each of their theoretical similarities. Theoretical connections can now be identified and linked together because within the reality of the world, concepts do overlap and overflow into one another. Representing the

217. Emily Beaulieu, *Electoral Protest and Democracy in the Developing World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 127.

reality of the world demands that these conceptions be unboxed and removed from isolation. Doing so will allow for a richer and more unified understanding of the manner in which domestic and international policies interact and affect one another.

CHAPTER FIVE

SANCTIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS LEVELS IN PRESIDENTIAL AND PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACIES

It is necessary to establish what the relationship between the impositions of economic sanctions and human rights integrity looks like within different democratic systems. In other words, what is the causal connection between sanctions and human rights in different democratic systems? Drawing from the literature and previous research on each individual topic, a connection can be discerned. Governmental legitimacy can be challenged if the citizenry is affected by the imposition of an economic sanction because the people hold the government responsible for their misery. Governments, fearing an uprising due to public displeasure, are inclined to repress the citizens within national borders. Sanctioning usually inflicts a greater harm upon the general population, worsening the level of human integrity rights which are recognized within a nation.^{218 219 220}

At the most fundamental level of conception, sanctions are a form of coercive diplomacy. Sanctions are issued and implemented to elicit a change or alteration of some type in a foreign state. Sanctions are not as forceful in their

218. Ang and Peksen 2007.

219. Peksen 2009.

220. Reed M. Wood, "A Hand Upon the Throat of the Nation: Economic Sanctions and State Repression, 1976-2001," *International Studies Quarterly*, 52 (2008).

ability to coerce a target as the process of military intervention; however, they remain a significant policy tool often utilized by political actors. Bartilow explains the differing goals which sanctions can be implemented to achieve. Coercive diplomacy can be divided into three separate, yet related, categories: Type A, Type B, and Type C. Type A coercive diplomacy is intended to persuade a target to abandon pursuit of a particular policy outcome.²²¹ The Type B variant of coercive diplomacy differs only in that the intended goal of the issuing state is to motivate a target to retract a policy which has already been implemented. Type C coercive diplomacy seeks to dismantle the political leadership in a target state and force them out of power in favor of a new government without an escalation to war.²²² Type C coercive diplomacy is arguably the most ambitious and the most difficult variant of coercive diplomacy to achieve because of the significant costs associated with removing a leader.

For sanctions to be effective the issuer must have some capability to effect or influence the target through the sanction. Therefore, a sanction leveled against the United States by a poorer and weaker nation is not likely to be as influential as a sanction issued by a stronger power against a weaker state. Sanctions can also be effective if they are issued against a target of equal power. Since the majority of sanctions are issued by developed nations toward developing nations, it can be

221. Bartilow 2001, 118.

222. Ibid., 118.

argued that it is democratic nations which are primarily issuing sanctions. While there is anecdotal evidence of democratic nations such as the United States undermining democracies in Latin America and the Caribbean during the early-to-mid-Twentieth century, most research would suggest that democracies are not prone to overtly attempt to force leadership change on another democracy. Therefore, due to shared democratic values, sanctions issued against democracies will be either Type A or B, with the goal of either preventing a policy or having the target retract the legislation after it has been instituted.

Presidential democratic electoral systems are rather fragile. The primary argument concerns the legacy of military dictatorship which is usually present within newly established presidential systems.^{223 224 225} Indeed, presidential systems might be particularly appealing in these nations because the citizens are accustomed to a strong central executive figure rather than a large legislative majority composed of coalitions and groups. Presidential systems are unique because they foster an environment in which:

Elected leaders use the office of the executive to concentrate their base of personal power, marginalize opposition forces and undermine the quality of democracy itself. In such cases, democracy is not overthrown but eroded, and so-called strong men (and it really is men) seek to remain in office indefinitely through the manipulation of popular opinion and concentration of power.²²⁶

223. Cheibub 2002.

224. Cheibub 2007.

225. Stepan and Skach 1993.

226. Landman 2013, 55.

Most scholars who study democratic electoral systems assert that presidential systems are more likely to revert into dictatorship if they fracture.^{227 228 229 230 231}

When there is a crisis in the government, it is impossible to remove the president and attempt to establish a new government as is the case in a parliamentary system. During a crisis the only solution in a presidential system is to essentially ride out the period with the current leader at the helm of the nation.²³² Thus,

Stepan and Skach argue that, “Such situations often cause both the president and the opposition to seek military involvement to resolve the crisis in their favor.”²³³

The president pushes the border of his delineated powers in an attempt to solve the issue and can, as a result erode the democratic values and processes which lifted them to power. Presidential systems have been shown to be more prone to collapse and reversion into dictatorial regimes.

This trait has been posited as arising through their constitutional framework which divides the powers into legislative and executive branches, and arguably more importantly, through the heritage of military dictatorship in which these fledgling democracies were conceived. Also, shocks to the economic or political system can lead elected presidents in transitioning democratic regimes to

227. Cheibub 2002.

228. Cheibub 2007.

229. Cheibub and Limongi 2002.

230. Linz and Valenzuela 1994.

231. Stepan and Skach 1993.

232. Ibid., 19.

233. Ibid., 19.

adopt policies which are much more repressive and undemocratic in nature. Therefore, when an economic sanction is issued against a presidential democracy, an economic crisis is created in the nation. This crisis can arise in a number of ways. For example, certain imports or exports might be blocked or aid money might be revoked or suspended. The imposition of the sanction affects the public through higher prices for imports or a reduced governmental capacity to provide public goods. Leaders will fear that segments within the population will seize an opportunity of perceived weakness in the regime and will present a threat to the ruling government.

Thus, sanctions can create an economic crisis in the target nation which can present a challenge to the authority of the leaders. As a response, the government will respond with repression of all forms of human rights. This includes both physical integrity rights and social and political rights. The repression of all forms of human rights serve the purpose of preventing the organization of political opponents and the abuse of physical integrity rights as a message that any insurrection will not be tolerated. This is the case even when there are not opportunistic groups within the nation. Instead, repression is occurring merely because of a perceived threat assessment by the president of the target nation.

By contrast, parliamentary systems are not expected to react to a crisis created by a sanction the same way because it is more difficult for leaders in these systems to individually assume massive amounts of power. Parliamentary

systems require coalitions and dependence in order for the government to effectively function. Since one individual cannot easily assume power, it is not likely for human rights to be violated by a power-hungry individual. Indeed, anecdotal evidence appears to support this distinction between presidential and parliamentary systems. Analyses have shown that parliamentary systems have a higher rate of survival as compared to presidential counterparts. Why would it be the case that parliamentary systems live longer than presidential electoral systems? According to Cheibub, “for the 1946-2002 period, the expected life of a presidential democracy was 24 years versus 58 for parliamentary ones.”²³⁴ This point is also iterated in an earlier piece by Cheibub in which he states, “Indeed, existing evidence shows that parliamentary democracies tend to last longer than presidential democracies...The instability of presidential democracies has been commonly accounted for by the principle of separation between executive and legislative authorities.”²³⁵ Therefore, when sanctions are applied which place pressure on the leadership of a parliamentary democratic system, the leaders are constrained by the legislative power which is inherent in the system. It is less likely that one individual or even a group of people will be able to impose repression on the population since power is predicated in coalitional governance.

234. Cheibub 2007, 136.

235. Cheibub 2002, 285.

Research Questions and Hypotheses

Two very salient questions arise from the previous research into human rights, democracy and economic sanctions. (1) What is the impact, if any, of economic sanctions upon physical integrity human rights in presidential democracies? (2) What is the impact, if any, of economic sanctions upon physical integrity human rights in parliamentary democracies?

Therefore, as an extension of the two research questions outlined there are two hypotheses which can be drawn from this theory. First, economic sanctions on presidential systems will lead to more systematic violations in all variants of human rights (H1). Second, presidential democratic systems will experience more human rights abuses than parliamentary systems (H2). Analysis of these hypotheses serve as a test of the theoretical connection between the distinct concepts of physical integrity human rights, economic sanctions, and democratic institutional composition.

CHAPTER SIX

CRACKING THE QUESTION: QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS

There are a number of datasets that quantitatively measure human rights. Of all the datasets available, the Cingranelli Richards Human Rights Database is one of the most extensively utilized measures of physical integrity rights. The database includes data on all countries from the period of 1981-2008 and contains individual measurements of numerous individual indicators of human rights components. Specifically, it includes four variables measured on a three-point scale: torture, extrajudicial killings, political disappearances, and political imprisonment, each of which is coded from 0 to 2.²³⁶ A value of 0 indicates high or frequent abuses of these rights while a value of 2 signifies very low or nonexistent levels of these violations. Further, these four variables are compiled into an additive index which ranges from 0 to 8 where 0 indicates no respect for any of these rights and 8 represents perfect respect for all the aspects of physical integrity rights.

The Cingranelli Richards Human Rights Database contains an inherent feature in the coding that can cause some confusion in the presentation and interpretation of any results which are obtained. The original coding scheme utilized by Cingranelli and Richards gives a value of 0 to severe and systematic

236. Abouharb and Cingranelli 2007.

violation and 2 as no violation of these rights. Keeping the variables in their original coding format can potentially lead to misinterpreting of the coefficients and misleading conclusions about the effect of the explanatory variables. The inverse coding scheme which Cingranelli and Richards use is simply counterintuitive. Therefore, it is appropriate to recode each of the measures of human rights so that higher levels of violations receive higher values on the ordinal scale. Therefore, a value of 0 now represents no abuse of the right by the government and a value of 2 indicates higher levels of abuse. Coding the variables as measures of violation allows for intuitive interpretation of coefficients that are produced through the quantitative analysis.

As with any analysis of a potentially ambiguous concept or set of concepts, it is essential to have a clear and precise conceptual definition of the idea that will allow for systematic and exact criteria for measurement. Political disappearances are defined by Cingranelli and Richards as cases where, “people have disappeared, political motivation appears likely, and the victims have not been found.”²³⁷ The difficulty in accurately coding the political imprisonment measurement becomes manifest when the ambiguity of political motivation is considered. There could be systematic bias in the coding of this variable in certain nations. Some nations might be especially adept at making individuals disappear without public knowledge, thereby biasing the estimate downward. On

237. Ibid.

the other hand, if the government is wrongfully attributed with the disappearance of people then the estimate could be too high. For example, in politically turbulent nations, random disappearances could be attributed to the government even when the government was not involved. Because political imprisonment, and the other physical integrity indicators, contain a global sample of nations, the bias has an equal probability of being either high or low, and can be considered stochastic noise.

The other three variables are more straightforward and are more easily defined. Torture, according to Cingranelli and Richards is the deliberate infliction of pain on individuals by the government. Torture can be both mental and physical in nature. Extrajudicial killings are defined as the killing of members of the citizenry by government officials without operating under the process of law.²³⁸ Finally, political imprisonment is the incarceration of individuals for their political or religious affiliation and their membership in racial, political and religious groups.²³⁹

In order to enhance the robustness of the results, other datasets for human rights have been employed. State Department and Amnesty International measures of human rights to obtain a more complete perspective of human rights. These indicators both cover the time period of 1976-2000, and their values range on a scale of 1-5. A value of 1 indicates systematic and uniform recognition and

238. Ibid.

239. Ibid.

protection of all physical integrity rights and a value of 5 indicates systematic repression of human rights. This measure suffers from the same problems as the additive index created by Richards and Cingranelli because it is impossible to determine what specific aspects of human rights are causing the value to change in each case, and what factors are being influenced by the sanctions. When used in conjunction with the individual components of the CIRI index, these two measures can serve as corroboration of any conclusions that are obtained and a substantial boost to this study's robustness.

To quantify economic sanctions it is appropriate to utilize the Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions dataset. This dataset includes not only sanctions that were imposed upon a target regime but also situations in which economic sanctions were threatened upon a target regime. This dataset covers the years from 1971-2000, representing a nearly two decade long period which is included in the human rights data. Types of sanctions that can be implemented include: economic embargoes, restrictions on imports and exports, freezing target assets, cessation of foreign aid to the target, travel ban, and blockades.²⁴⁰ These various forms of economic sanctions are coded into an ordinal measure ranging from 0 to 2. A value of 0 indicates no sanction or threat imposed in a given year. If less severe forms of sanctions are threatened or implemented the target country

240. T. Clifton Morgan, Valentin Krustev, Navin Bapat and Yoshi Kobayashi, "The Threat and Imposition of Sanctions : Updating the TIES dataset," *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 31.5 (2014): 541-558.

receives a value of 1 in a particular year. Severe sanctions implemented against a target warrant a value of 2 according to the ordinal scale of sanction severity.²⁴¹

Variables such as interstate and civil conflict are measured and included in the analysis.^{242 243 244 245 246 247 248 249} Nations that are engaged in international wars are occupied with the affairs of the battlefield and feel politically susceptible to any perceived act of sedition. Because the government feels vulnerable, it will repress the population to prevent any threat. Likewise, when a nation is embroiled in a civil war, every citizen is a potential enemy. The government will repress and violate the physical integrity rights of the population in an attempt to eliminate potential enemy soldiers and sympathizers. The research designs

241. Peksen 2009.

242. Christian Davenport, "Multi-Dimensional Threat Perception and State Repression: An Inquiry Into Why States Apply Negative Sanctions," *American Journal of Political Science*, 39.3 (1995).

243. Rhoda E. Howard and Jack Donnelly, "Human Dignity, Human Rights and Political Regimes," *American Political Science Review*, 80.3 (1986).

244. Neil Mitchell, Rhoda E. Howard and Jack Donnelly, "Liberalism, Human Rights, and Human Dignity," *American Political Science Review*, 81.3 (1987).

245. Peksen 2009.

246. Poe 1992.

247. Steven C. Poe and Neal Tate, "Repression of Human Rights to Personal Integrity in the 1980s: A Global Analysis," *American Political Science Review*, 88.4 (1994).

248. David L. Richard, Ronald Gelleny and David H. Sacko, "Money With a Mean Streak? Foreign Economic Penetration and Government Respect for Human Rights in the Developing Countries," *International Studies Quarterly*, 45.2 (2001).

249. Sabine C. Zanger, "A Global Analysis of the Effect of Political Regime Changes on Life Integrity Violations, 1977-93," *Journal of Peace Research*, 37.2 (2000).

which incorporate measures of these variables that serve as control mechanisms have arrived at quite dissimilar results. War, or the presence of hostilities in a nation, either from the actions of a rebel group within the state or an international adversary, is hypothesized to have a negative impact upon human rights violations. If any type of war is occurring within a nation during a period of observation, it is believed that the human rights of citizens will be less secure and more likely to be violated by the regime. Previous literature on human rights fails to deliver any semblance of a consensus on whether civil or interstate war has any significant effect upon human rights violations. Poe and Tate find that both international and civil conflict have a significant positive effect upon levels of human rights violations within a nation²⁵⁰ while Peksen concludes that civil war operates as expected similar to as in Poe and Tate's study, but international conflict is not significant at all.²⁵¹ Peace years simply measured as the number of years since the last military conflict within a nation is expected to be inversely related to higher levels of violation. Finally, the political instability of a nation and how close they are to engaging in conflict is expected to be related to higher values of repression.

The replication data used by Peksen includes the complete data from both the Cingranelli Richards Human Rights Database and the Threat and Imposition

250. Poe and Tate 1994, 866.

251. Peksen 2009, 74.

of Economic Sanctions data. The Peksen dataset also includes revised and recoded variables for each of the human rights measurements included in the Cingranelli Richards Database. Peksen recognized the inherent problems of the counterintuitive coding scheme of these variables and corrected for the problem. The second important contribution of the Peksen data is that he distinguished between sanctions that were issued over human rights issues and those which were implemented for other reasons. By using the measure of economic sanctions that does not include sanctions issued over human rights issues there is no longer a threat of the coefficients and standard errors being biased by endogeneity. Sanctions are coded on a scale of 0 through 2. A value of 0 indicates no sanction implemented, a value of 1 indicated limited and less severe sanctions, and a value of 2 indicates severe and costly sanctions. While this coding scheme limits the amount of variation within the variable, it does allow analysis through maximum likelihood estimation because of the ordinal nature of the coding. Population and GDP per capita data is included in this data set and is logged so that each exhibits a more normalized distribution.

Civil war, international war, peace years, and political instability information are obtained from the data collected and used by Clayton L. Thyne in his article “Cheap Signals with Costly Consequences: The Effect of Interstate

Relations on Civil War, 1945—1999.”²⁵² In this dataset, Thyne uses a dummy variable to measure civil war, international war, and political instability. The peace years variable is coded to represent the number of years since the last military conflict that the nation was engaged in. According to Thyne, “Instability captures possible weakness and disorganization in states that have recently become independent or have undergone major transitions.”²⁵³ By combining the replication data of Peksen and Thyne, it will be possible to draw robust, conclusions concerning the relationship between economic sanctions and human rights levels within distinct democratic regimes.

Finally, the data, which distinguishes democracies according to their electoral system, is obtained from the replication data of Alvarez, Cheibub, Limongi, and Przeworski’s study.²⁵⁴ This data, which covers the time period of 1950-1990 assigns a value of 1 to parliamentary systems, 2 to mixed democratic systems that are semi-presidential, and 3 to presidential democracies. Autocratic, or non-democratic states receive a value of 0. Because this analysis is concerned with democracies, and not autocratic nations, it is necessary to drop all autocratic nations from the sample leaving only variation in the institutional makeup of

252. Clayton L. Thyne, “ABC’s, 123’s, and the Golden Rule: The Pacifying Effect of Education on Civil War, 1980-1999,” *International Studies Quarterly*, 50 (2006).

253. *Ibid.*, 741.

254. Mike Alvarez, Jose Antonio Cheibub, Fernando Limongi and Adam Przeworski, “Classifying Political Regimes,” *Studies in Comparative International Development*, 31.2 (1999).

democracies. Further, because autocracies make up such a large share of the original dataset, these values will skew and bias the coefficients no matter how they are coded. Also, this dataset includes a variable which measures how often leadership changes within a nation. Using this measurement, it is possible to determine the extent to which leadership is susceptible to electoral pressure or whether the leadership is insulated from political threat.

Typically, data pertaining to regime type or institutional composition is dichotomized for ease of use and interpretation. The coding system employed for this thesis keeps the measure of presidentialism in its original coding scheme. Running the entire series of analysis with both the original measure as designed by Alvarez, Cheibub, Limongi, and Przeworski and the dichotomous institutional composition measure reveal no differences in either the direction or the levels of statistical significance of the coefficients. Transforming the original three-point scale of presidentialism also throws out valuable information inherent in the measure. By using the original measurement system, conclusions can be made about movement along a scale of presidentialism rather than just presidential democracies or parliamentary governments.

Data obtained from Alvarez, Cheibub, Limongi, and Przeworski also offers a measurement of riots, which is given a value representing the number of violent protests with over 100 participants during a year. Nations with more riots in a year should be more prone to repress, *ceteris paribus*, as the government seeks to control the violence within the national borders. Also, they include a

measurement for the period of recovery after wars or conflicts. This variable is given a value of 1 for every year within the five-year period after a conflict has ceased, and a value of 0 otherwise. Physical integrity rights are expected to be diminished in this period because the leadership is still wary of reverting into violence and will respond to any potential problem with violence and repression. In summation, the dataset which is being utilized offers a time period of analysis from 1976-1990 using the State Department and Amnesty International data and 1981-1990 using the CIRI index.

Limitations

There are many ways to test the two hypotheses derived from the theory of human rights and economic sanctions through statistical and empirical means. Due to the fact that the dependent variables, the different measures of human rights, are all discrete there are regression assumptions which are violated. Because of heteroskedascity and non-linearity within the data, the standard errors obtained will be wrong, however, the coefficients will remain unbiased. Therefore, because of the noise added to the standard errors it is possible that the conclusions will lead to a Type II error where the null hypothesis is retained when it would actually be possible to reject the null hypothesis in favor of the alternative hypothesis. Worse, it is possible that if the correlation between the independent variable and the error term, “are positively correlated, the bias in s_b is negative, and thus s_b will tend to underestimate the standard deviation of the OLS

estimator, b.”²⁵⁵ The result of such a bias in the standard errors would lead to a Type I error in which the null hypothesis is erroneously rejected in favor of an alternative hypothesis when there is insufficient evidence to do so given the data that was used. While OLS models could be used in this research, it is more fitting for a weighted least squares model, generalized least squares model, or maximum likelihood estimation to be used instead. While it is not an optimal solution, it is possible to cross check the regression analysis using the robust qualifier in STATA 11.0 SE and if the robust standard errors did not change the p-values for any of the coefficients in the full models it might be tempting to accept the standard errors as unbiased. The usage of the robust qualifier is, at best, a treatment and not a cure for the violations of the classic regression model.

Results obtained from a simple OLS analysis alone will not be adequate to test the two hypotheses primarily because the variables of interest are measured at the ordinal or nominal level instead of continuous at the interval level.²⁵⁶ Because of the numerous violations of OLS regression assumptions a more sophisticated and nuanced approach to the data is warranted. This analysis utilizes ordinal data to measure both economic sanctions and human rights and most of the control variables are either nominal or ordinal. Due to the limited nature of the both the explanatory and response variables in this analysis, a series of ordered probit

255. William D. Berry and Stanley Feldman, *Multiple Regression in Practice* (Newbury Park: Sage University Paper, 1985), 78.

256. *Ibid.*, 10.

models appears to be the most appropriate means to test the hypotheses. Ordered probit models are specifically designed to account for ordinal dependent variables such as the different measures of physical integrity rights used. This analysis will consist of probit models for both parliamentary and presidential democratic states. By conducting the analysis through the lens of maximum likelihood estimation the conclusions obtained will be more efficient and robust than if OLS regression was utilized.

As mentioned briefly in the introduction of this project, the issue of the potential for an endogeneity bias must be assessed. Technically speaking, endogeneity occurs when the explanatory variable is correlated with the error term.²⁵⁷ The fundamental problem with an endogenous bias is that a feedback loop is created where it is impossible to understand how the independent variable is influencing the dependent variable, or even if there is a reverse causality, in which the dependent variable is influencing the independent variable.²⁵⁸ Because the Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions dataset is so thorough and includes the actual motivation for the sanction in the dataset, there is a way in which I can correct for endogeneity by using this dataset. It is possible to exclude all cases in which the motivation for the sanctions had anything to do with human

257. Jeffrey M. Woolridge, *Introductory Econometrics: A Modern Approach* (Australia: South-Western, 2013), 82-83.

258. Jan Kmenta, *Elements of Econometrics* (New York: MacMillan, 1986), 651-733.

rights. Through the elimination of these cases that could feed an endogenous loop I am essentially removing any feedback which is occurring. Because the motivation for the sanction is known and only cases of sanctions that were implemented for reasons other than violations or repression of human rights, the potential for feedback and endogenous bias is significantly reduced. Another solution to the potential bias resulting from endogeneity would be the formulation of a set of instrumental variables that are correlated only with economic sanctions and can be measured against components of human rights. If these instruments are not sufficient or theoretically strong, the bias will not only remain but will actually be exacerbated. Thus, a more practical and pragmatic solution is the exclusion of sanctions which were issued in response to human rights dilemmas. This solution frees the analysis theoretically from the quandary of endogeneity, and alleviates the problems that could result from poor instrumentation. It is also argued by many methodologists that it is possible to lag the explanatory variable to correct for an endogenous bias. According to this logic, there is a temporal gap that is created by lagging the explanatory variable, the correlation between the two variables is eliminated due to a previous years observation being directly related to the current observation year. Yet, lagging of the explanatory variables was not implemented into this research design because, “lagged explanatory variables is almost never justified on identification grounds, and so it

does not buy causal identification on the cheap.”²⁵⁹ Therefore, due to the limitations inherent in the approach of lagging explanatory variables as a panacea for an endogenous bias, it is more methodologically and theoretically sound to opt for the utilization of appropriate data to serve as indicators of the concepts of interest.

Findings: Are All Democracies Equal?

To test the hypotheses outlined, 18 different ordered probit models were utilized that incorporated seven different measurements of physical integrity rights. Because it was hypothesized that physical integrity rights levels are contingent upon the institutional composition of a democratic nation (i.e. whether the democracy is a presidential or a parliamentary system) and the simultaneous severity of an imposed sanction, it was necessary to create a variable which measured the interaction between institution and sanction severity. This interaction term acts as the main explanatory variable through this analysis. Examination of the entirety of the results presents interesting conclusions dependent upon the measurement that was utilized in the particular test. Using different measures of human rights produce drastically different conclusions

259. Marc F. Bellemare, Takaaki Masaki and Thomas B. Pepinsky, “Lagged Explanatory Variables and the Estimation of Causal Effects,” MarcFBellemare.com, accessed March 29, 2018, <http://marcfbellemare.com/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/BMPLagIdentificationFebruary2015.pdf>.

about the implications of physical integrity rights within different types of democratic regimes that have been the target of economic sanctions.

Finding One

The first finding pertains to the level of torture that is exhibited between different forms of democracy. Ordered probit results for the models using the three-point ordinal scale of torture are found in Table 1. In both of the descriptive models, the variables of interest move in a positive direction and are statistically significant. Within the first descriptive model (Model 1A) which measures the interaction of presidentialism and sanction severity, the coefficient is positive and significant at the 0.002 level indicating that a relationship this strong would have only been obtained .2% of the time, purely by chance, given this data. The second descriptive model of torture provides similarly expected results. Both presidentialism and the severity of sanctions are strongly statistically significant and move in a positive direction as hypothesized. Therefore, the first descriptive model (Model 1A) suggests that as democracies become more presidential in their institutional design, and more severe sanctions are imposed that torture will increase. Likewise, the positive and significant coefficients for both presidentialism and sanction severity (Model 1B) indicate that nations which are more presidential in their makeup and democracies which have more severe sanctions are associated with higher levels of human rights repression. It is not possible to establish causality from a bivariate or descriptive model. Examination

of the complete model which contains the full set of variables is necessary for more robust conclusions to be drawn that are in concordance with the theory which has been established and outlined.

The results for the complete model of torture present some interesting findings. Looking at the coefficients in Table 1 for Model 1C, it can be seen that the measure of presidentialism is still positive and significant. The interaction term between presidentialism and the severity of the sanctions is no longer significant at any accepted level. More interesting, the coefficient for sanction severity is now negative and is no longer statistically significant. This explains why the interaction term between presidentialism and sanction severity is no longer significant. Because this variable measures the interaction between presidentialism and the severity of sanctions, the contrasting direction of the coefficients erodes the likelihood of obtaining statistical significance. What the full model of torture shows is that more presidential democratic regimes are correlated with higher levels of torture. Presidential regimes have a higher probability of torturing citizens than do parliamentary democracies. This relationship does not appear to operate through the imposition or severity of economic sanctions. Sanction severity actually has an inverse relationship with torture, as exhibited by the negative coefficient. Therefore, as sanction severity increases, democratic nations are less inclined to torture their populations. Civil war, sanction duration, and population are all positive and significantly related to

torture, as expected. GDP per capita, has a negative coefficient and is significant, indicating that as wealth in a nation increases, democratic nations are less apt to resort to torture as a policy.

Finding Two

Continuing, the second finding pertains to the levels of political killings and the distinctions according to presidentialism. The results from the series of models examining the relationship of the explanatory variables with political killing present a similar picture as the first series of ordered probit regressions focused on torture. In model 2A and 2B, presented on Table 2, the descriptive models behave as expected and in a similar manner to the earlier models using torture. In Model 2A, the interaction between sanction severity and the presidentialism of a democracy is statistically significant and has a positive coefficient as predicted. In Model 2B, both of the variables of interest possess positive and strongly statistically significant coefficients. With the full ordered probit model, the significance for the interaction term disappears, and the coefficient's direction changes and is now negative. Of the main explanatory variables, only presidentialism remains significant. Just as with the full model of torture, democratic systems that are more presidential in their framework are strongly related to more systematic and widespread instances of political killings. Although, just as with the analysis on torture, the severity of the economic sanction that is imposed does not seem to factor into whether more presidential

nations engage in political killings. Still, the more presidential a system, the more likely it is that the nations will engage in political killings.

Findings Three and Four

The third and fourth findings are concerned with arguably less severe forms of human rights violations, especially when compared to torture and killings. These are the findings related to political imprisonment and disappearances, respectively. The final two series of ordered probits conducted using components of the CIRI index, are arguably less severe forms of human rights abuses. Political imprisonment and disappearances, while unsavory, are not perceived with the same degree of international outrage with which killings and torture are viewed. While killings and torture are events which make the evening news and draw public outrage, both domestically and internationally, disappearances and imprisonment tend to go under the public radar. Therefore, it would seem that democracies, in an attempt to protect their international image would be more inclined to implement these types of repressive tactics. This assumption does not hold upon examination of the series of ordered probit regressions using political imprisonment and disappearances. In both Tables 3 and 4, the coefficients in the descriptive models all behave as expected and are strongly significant. Both presidentialism and sanction severity are significant and positive, indicating a that more presidential democracies and more severe sanctions are associated with higher levels of disappearances and political

imprisonment. Further, when political disappearances and imprisonment are regressed on the interaction between sanction severity and presidentialism's coefficient is positive and significant as expected. The bivariate ordered probit regression in Models 3A and 4A initially suggest that as nations that are more presidential are subjected to more severe sanctions, that both political imprisonment and disappearances will increase. Once again, upon running an ordered probit regression for the complete models, the results become less clear. Most notable is the model for political imprisonment displayed in Table 4. None of the key variables are significant, and the coefficient for the measure of sanction severity is negative indicating that as more stringent and intense sanctions are imposed on a democracy, the incidents of imprisonment for political motives becomes less prevalent. Similarly, the coefficient for sanction severity is also negative and insignificant in Model 3C in Table 3. Because of the weakness of these coefficients with respect to their standard errors it is impossible to say with any certainty that these relationships are not being reported in these equations by mere chance.

Finding Five

The fifth finding is an aggregate model of human rights violations that uses the Amnesty International data rather than the CIRI index of human rights violations. Instead of merely determining whether to retain the null hypothesis or reject it, based solely on the ordered probit tests using the CIRI indicators, this

analysis also tested the set of variables using human rights data from other sources of data. Although the Amnesty International data is an index, so it is not possible to see what form of violations are causing movement along the scale, when used in conjunction with other data robustness is heightened. Table 5 contains the results from the series of ordered probit models using human rights data from Amnesty International as the dependent variable. Just as with the models in Tables 1-4, the descriptive models show a positive and strong statistically significant relationship. Most notably, however, is that when the full model with all control variables included is utilized, the significance of the coefficient for sanction severity and presidentialism's interaction not only evaporates and becomes insignificant, the sign also changes. Model 5C in Table 5 shows that the interaction term of sanction severity and presidentialism has a coefficient of $-.069$. A negative sign for this coefficient suggests a relationship that is in complete contrast to the hypotheses set forth in this paper. Instead of human rights being harmed as a result of democracies which are more presidential experiencing sanctions, a negative coefficient for this variable indicates that human rights are adversely affected by parliamentary systems that are sanctioned. Although the direction of the coefficient is interesting, the high standard error, and therefore, the low Z-score means that it is not certain whether this result was obtained by accident given the data utilized. Outside of the interaction term, presidentialism remains statistically significant and shows a positive coefficient.

Finding Six

The sixth, and final finding, is similar to the finding of the Amnesty International data, however, for this model and finding, State Department data was utilized. Of all of the measures and models utilized in this analysis, only the State Department indicator of human rights integrity produces results that completely support hypotheses 1 and 2. In Model 6C presented in Table 6, the coefficient of the interaction term between sanction severity and presidentialism is positive and statistically significant with a P-value greater than .001. A P-value this strong indicates that I would have arrived at these results less than one time in a thousand by complete chance if there was no relationship between the interaction and the State Department measurement of human rights. Therefore, the State Department data supports the argument that the imposition of more severe types of economic sanctions against democracies with more presidentialist political structures. Interestingly, while the coefficient for presidentialism is significant and positive, the coefficient for the severity of the imposed sanction is negative and statistically significant.

For example, Figure 2 shows that the average presidential system is over 38% less likely to see low or limited levels of political killing than the average presidential democracy. Similarly, moderate levels of political killings are 31% more likely in presidential systems than parliamentary ones, and the probability of pervasive and systematic killings jumps just over 7% when moving to a

presidential democracy. This substantive and statistical trend holds across all models except for political imprisonment.

CHAPTER SEVEN

UNWRAPPING THE ANALYSIS: THE INTERPRETATION OF FINDINGS

Assessing the Expected and the Unexpected

Three distinct conclusions are gleaned from this research. A first conclusion, in relation to the first research question and the subsequent first hypothesis, that economic sanctioning would exacerbate the human rights atrocities in presidential democracies is not wholly supported by this analysis. Second, the second research question and hypothesis, is that presidential democracies are more apt to repress their populations. Third, there is some inconsistency within the data, as different datasets offer different results and can potentially lead to different conclusions if considered in isolation. In other words, there are substantive differences in human rights levels between democratic states, but it cannot be said with any authority that economic sanctions have any impact on these levels in any direction.

Commencing with the first research question and hypothesis, looking at the results paints an interesting perspective of just how democratic states operate and how different types of democracies can vary tremendously on issues that are perceived to be core attributes of the democratic conceptualization. Interestingly, the results indicate an unexpected trend in some respect. Sanctioning as a catalyst for repression in democratic states is insignificant. What is interesting, and

expected, is that there is a marked difference of statistical significance in the respect levels for basic human rights and freedoms between different forms of democratic government within a nation. Ultimately, the type of democracy that is instituted as a governing system can have tremendous implications for the people who are represented via a democratic system.

An examination of the results of all full models shows some interesting trends. In all but the full model using State Department data, the interaction between sanction severity and presidentialism was statistically insignificant. Further, coefficients for sanction severity were negative in all models, except for killing where the coefficient was statistically insignificant. Finding negative coefficients for this variable across most of the models leads to the conclusion that when more severe sanctions are imposed against any type of democratic regime, human rights typically improve. Therefore, all types of democracies are not equal in regard to their respect for human rights. In all of the full models except for political imprisonment, presidentialism is positively associated with increased levels of violating a particular human rights indicator. Human rights are typically worse in presidential regimes. Although, the theory that I offered is not entirely exhibited in the results provided by the data, it is the case that the data does support my theoretical assumption that presidential systems are more likely to violate their populations than democratic systems governed by parliament. Because sanction severity is actually inversely related to human rights abuses in

democratic nations, appears that implementing sanctions might actually help human rights in presidential systems rather than cause harm.

The different measures of physical integrity rights which make up the CIRI index did not support the first hypothesis that presidential systems will violate physical integrity rights more than parliamentary democracies. The interaction term between sanction severity and presidentialism was not significant in any of the models and the coefficient of sanction severity shifted from a positive to a negative orientation contingent upon the measure of physical integrity rights used. Only presidentialism remained fairly consistent across most of the models, moving as expected and exhibiting a statistically significant coefficient in three of the four full models.

There remains the question of what precisely is different within the State Department data that is causing results which are not in line with the CIRI index or the Amnesty dataset. Recall, that it was only with the State Department data that results which were in agreement with both hypotheses were achieved. While it is only speculation, one of the main reasons for the difference could be due to the fact that the State Department is a governmental agency and the CIRI and Amnesty data sets were compiled by individuals and through a non-governmental organization. With any index, it is difficult to know what is causing movement along the scale. It is possible that there is a different threshold for violations by those conducting the measurements at the State Department. The deeper question

that would require more insight into State Department intelligence techniques is whether it is more accurate than data collected by nongovernmental organizations. Because the resources of the federal government is behind the State Department, it is entirely possible that it is the case that their data is the most representative of reality. That is beyond the scope of this examination.

The second research question and hypothesis' analysis reveal conclusions more in accord with the theory described above. Results obtained by running the ordered probit models through Clarify reveal the substantive change in probability from moving from a parliamentary system to a presidential democracy. In running the model, all other variables were set to their mean, in order to see the difference in human rights recognition between average presidential and average parliamentary democratic systems. Table 7 shows the results from using Clarify on all of the full ordered probit models. Moving from a parliamentary democracy to a presidential system, decreases the probability of encountering the lowest level of repression for any of the indicators.

Results for tests using CIRI's political imprisonment variable are enigmatic. It would seem natural that imprisonment would be less severe than torture and killings, and that nations that are engaging in seemingly more severe types of repression would have high levels of imprisonment by default. The data does not support this conclusion. While arguably more severe forms or repression are strongly associated with systems that are presidential, imprisonment remains

insignificant. One theoretical answer for this perplexing result lies in the visibility of political prisoners. These people are often able to get their message out to domestic and international groups. Democracies, which care about their reputation among other actors, might opt for severe forms of repression, which inhibit the flow of information to other groups in the international arena.²⁶⁰ Instead of merely imprisoning individuals governments determine to silence them by killing or simply causing them to disappear instead.

Political imprisonment might display unexpected and statistically insignificant coefficients because democracies find non-political reasons to incarcerate political targets. According to the coding scheme devised by Cingranelli and Richards, political imprisonment is the incarceration of individuals for their political or religious affiliation and their membership in racial, political and religious groups.²⁶¹ Instead of arresting individuals for their opposition of the ruling government, people are charged with other offenses in an attempt to euphemize the political nature of the incarceration. An individual leading a protest rally might be detained and charged with disorderly conduct. Instability in the indicator could be a consequence of a lack of available information. It is possible that presidential regimes are more likely to violate physical integrity rights through political imprisonment, but these governments

260. Michael Tomz, "Domestic Audience Cost in International Relations: An Experimental Approach," *International Organization*, 61 (2007).

261. Abouharb and Cingranelli 2007.

have found a way to obscure the true level of political prisoners within their borders.

Ultimately, the results indicate support for the second hypothesis, however, not the first hypothesis posited. While economic sanctioning is statistically moot as a motivation for a democracy to repress, a statistically significant and strong trend exists between the presidential composition of a democracy and their propensity to repress. As was the expectation of this analysis, presidential democracies do repress more than their parliamentary siblings. Not all democracies are alike with respect for their recognition of basic human dignity rights. It should be expected that the United States and other Western, democratic, states will continue to push for international foreign policy that focuses on fostering democratic transition around the world. This research has added to the literature that urging democratic transition alone is not sound policy. Policy should be focused instead and seek to maximize both the potential for long-term success of democracy and simultaneously the goal of human rights.

CHAPTER EIGHT

FOR THE FUTURE: POLICY AND RESEARCH RECOMMENDATIONS

Power of the People?

The quantitative analysis conducted in the previous chapter provides a clear distinction amongst democratic regimes. Not all democracies are equal in their respect for the physical integrity rights of their populations. Violations of physical integrity protections are the most fundamental and universally accepted variations of human rights. The truth of physical respect can be traced back across millennia. The Golden Rule, derived from the Biblical teaching of Jesus, where followers are instructed to, “Do unto others as you would have them do unto you,” highlights the principle at the most basic functional level.²⁶² Other religions have similar sentiments within their respective scriptural literature. The notion of the respect of the person has been integral to the relationship of the state to the person from the onset of civilization dating back to Hammurabi and the code that he established. More so, the state has been viewed as an instrument of protection, rather than harm, of the individual and their personal rights such as their physical bodies, personal beliefs and even their property.²⁶³ Likewise, democracies typically operate through their protection of individual rights. Recall

262. Matthew 7:12.

263. Frederic Bastiat, *The Law* (Auburn: Ludwig von Mises Institute, 2007), 21.

that democracies operate through consent of the governed and the government is constructed as an instrument of representation of the citizenry.

Analysis conducted in this paper argued against much of the generally accepted knowledge of democracies. Democracies are typically perceived as virtuous counterparts to the inherent evil of autocracies. Autocracies, after all, inflict physical harm on their populations and repress them through fear and intimidation. First, and most fundamental, the findings of this thesis have shown that not all democratic forms of government are equal in their respect for human rights. In relation to the first research question and the first hypothesis, presidential systems' linkage to military authoritarianism makes them more susceptible to repressive governmental tactics against citizens. In this work, it has been attempted to theoretically explain this relationship positing that the imposition of economic sanctions act as a catalyst for violence against populations in presidential democracies. This relationship was not significant.

Parliamentary democracies, as outlined in the second research question and the second hypothesis, were less likely than presidential democracies to repress their populations. This held across multiple indicators of human rights levels. Differences between parliamentary and presidential systems were significant. Presidential systems have a lower probability of having little or no incidents of repression and a higher probability of experiencing all other levels of repressions across every indicator except political imprisonment. Finally, in

many models the severity of a sanction had an inverse relationship with repression, indicating that a side effect of more severe sanctions could possibly be higher levels of human rights recognition in democratic nations. This is uncertain as most coefficients were statistically insignificant.

The first primary policy implication to arise from this thesis pertains to the democratization mission of the United States' and other nations' foreign policy trajectories. This research brings a new angle to the discussion of how nations should democratize. As the United States and other Western powers attempt to spread democracy, the leaders of these nations should be mindful that the electoral system which a nation adopts can have severe ramifications for the citizens in these nations. Spreading democracy is not enough. Care must be taken to ensure that the democratic framework of nations ensures the protection of fundamental human freedoms and the physical integrity of all people. Sadly, presidential systems do not offer this assurance better than parliamentary systems. The United States, especially, has been inconsistent at best with how it crafts foreign policy over human rights. Julie A. Mertus has instead, advocated a "human rights culture" be cultivated in the United States at all levels of society. In a state where the overwhelming majority of individuals, over 90 percent, have no understanding of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, it is little surprise that the policy of the United States over human rights is inconsistent, or even

dangerous in some respects.²⁶⁴ Policy flows from the population, and those who seek votes to remain in power will notice the sentiments of the electorate.

Second, the domestic implications upon civil society and the private population are also manifest from this research. The answer according to Mertus, and many who share her perspective, is that policy can be more appropriately influenced and shaped through the work of citizens and communities. According to Mertus, “Wholly apart from activities related to international treaties and domestic legislation, civil society organizations have found creative ways to shape policy options.”²⁶⁵ Via activists, private organizations and increased education and awareness, pressure can be put not only onto nations which are deficient in their respect for human rights in its various capacities, but also on states which interact with offending states. Trade, military engagement, and other variations of cooperation can be shaped through domestic pressure on leaders and have international consequences and ramifications. Therefore, within the United States, it is possible, through the vehicle of civil society, that “smart democratization” can be emphasized as a policy preference amongst voters and that human rights will improve as a consequence of states moving toward fuller, and more representative variants of democracy rather than presidential systems which often maintain facets of authoritarian governance.

264. Julie A. Mertus, *Bait and Switch: Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Policy* (New York: Routledge, 2008), 239.

265. *Ibid.*, 195.

Third, and finally, the role of the United States in the world order must be assessed domestically and internationally. This is a pivotal implication that springs out of these findings. The United States is perceived to be a world leader in the proliferation of democratic ideals and the fundamental principles of human rights. Much of the private American psyche is encapsulated within the context of America operating as a bastion for liberty, freedom and security.²⁶⁶ America is understood to be exceptional, doing what no other nation can, or will do. America is held to a higher moral standard than the other nations of the world. When other nations falter, no one notices or cares, when America slips, or appears to be slipping in some manner, the world waits anxiously to see what the outcome will be.²⁶⁷ Further, America, according to Huntington is important due to the fact that America is a beacon of democratic values which other nations desire to possess, and which only America is fit or able to transfer to other nations. He attempts to corroborate this claim by citing the historical record of American involvement and intervention in the developing world throughout the twentieth century. When America intervened in the affairs of Latin America and the Caribbean democracy showed signs of proliferation and solidification. When American power and dominance over the international system began to wane in the 1970s, the prospect for democratic governance and ideals in these nations was curtailed and the United States was only able to attempt to influence these new

266. Ibid., 27.

267. Huntington 1996, 305.

leaders to treat their populations with dignity and to honor their basic fundamental freedoms.²⁶⁸

Moving the Ball Forward: Suggestions for Future Research

While this inquiry has attempted to examine the concept of democracy via the nuances and variations that compose this political system rather than as the sum of its parts, there is still considerable work that can and should be conducted to further elucidate the complexity of democratic systems. Future research into this area can expand on this work and further add to the understanding of each of the concepts that have been explored throughout this project.

First, research in the future can approach this question, or a similar question, from a different methodological perspective. Methodologically, it utilized a quantitative approach to addressing the three research questions It commenced with and to assess my hypotheses which followed. It was, therefore, able to consider all democracies under sanctions policy for nearly thirty years ranging from the Cold War through to the post-September 11th, 2001 period. Because of the large timeframe and the scope of this study it seems that the generalizability is strong. In looking at the aggregate range of democracy, it is possible to further predict how the form and structure of a nation's democratic

268. Samuel P. Huntington, "American Ideals Versus American Institutions," *Political Science Quarterly* 97, no. 1 (1982): 27-32.

institutions will impact the domestic human rights levels once an exogenous economic catalyst is introduced.

Second, future research can expand the theoretical scope of this research into their own project. As has been made clear, it was determined to utilize the imposition or the threat of an economic sanction as a major factor of whether a democracy will repress the human rights of its citizenry and also when that repression will manifest. Obviously, because economic sanctions are part of the interaction term that comprise the independent variable, the repression must occur afterward, or at the very least, increase after the imposition of the sanction. Further research into this area can also be expanded theoretically and push into areas beyond the imposition or threat of an economic sanctions. The possibilities for expansion through further nuanced inquiry are limitless.

Most striking, and disappointing, within the models that were employed in this research, economic sanctions did not arise as being of any statistical significance. Therefore, sanctioning is not a precedent for repression as was initially hypothesized. Through more theoretical work, it would be a valid endeavor to attempt to parse out more of the nuances of how and why democracies differ with their respect for fundamental freedoms. That is, what are some preconditions that might explain what would lead presidential states to feel the theorized externally imposed shock on their domestic security and to respond with repressions. From a theoretical perspective it is possible to consider a

multitude of possible potentially theoretically significant concepts that can be utilized instead of economic sanctions. Future research can utilize similar models to the ones employed in this project in an attempt to analyze the concepts that are deemed of interest.

Third, there are extending projects that are able to be derived utilizing a similar format, theoretical approach and methodology. Two research projects seem immediately pertinent. First, because this study only looked at the threat posed through an economic lens, it would be enlightening to conduct a similar study where the threat is measured along an ordinal scale and interacted with the ordinal scale of “presidentialism” which has been employed in this research. By looking at the severity of the external threat posed and interact the measurement with the type of democracy instituted, further information into the realities of democracy and democratic governance can be achieved. Democracy is seen as a bastion of physical, civil and other human rights. If these are voided in the face of a mounting threat, then the promise of democracy might not be as sterling as it is perceived to be and it would be best for leaders and policy advisors to push for smart democracies which can address these fundamental shortcomings. Further, previous research has shown that democracies take time to form and coalesce into what they are ultimately going to become one day. Just like a child takes time to form into an adult, no matter the potential that is present within the child, it takes time for the child to develop and actualize into their potential. Further research

should also examine the lifespan of democracy. Examining this variable and incorporating it into a future project can add a new layer by considering the time that it takes for a nation's democratic endeavors to congeal into a functioning democracy which might be more likely to protect human rights regardless of the level of threat faced.

On a similar, yet unrelated note, it is possible for this research to be flipped on its head and to be analyzed from the perspective of autocracies rather than democracies. Just as there is variation and differences between democratic institutions, so to do autocracies vary. In fact, the variations are far more plentiful and nuanced in their composition. Yet there is a tendency among both policy makers and historians as well to homogenize types of autocracies.²⁶⁹ Looking at autocracies in a similar manner will help examination of past, present and future policies with respect to these types of nations. Ultimately, autocracies are a major global reality. Many nations, even ones that have democratic tendencies, or were once democratic themselves, have autocratic governments. With globalization and development occurring across the world, many autocratic nations are becoming global economic and military powers that cannot be ignored and must, therefore, be understood more completely and thoroughly. In fact, there is the potential to expand this research out into a complete global analysis where

269. Timothy Snyder, *Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin* (New York: Basic Books, 2010).

governmental system is viewed along a spectrum in which movement from autocracy to democracy can be assessed once a logical structure for an ordinal scale of governance can be constructed and systemized.

CHAPTER NINE

CONCLUSION

In this research, it has been attempted to show how physical integrity rights are differently impacted across varying democratic systems. In using economic sanctions as a representation of an exogenous threat or shock to the domestic system, a likely scenario in which these rights would likely be restricted or violated has also been displayed. Arguably, it logically follows that the propensity for violation would increase as the threat similarly increases. What has been shown is that the type of democracy that a nation maintains does matter. Overall, presidential systems are more likely to repress in the event of a crisis than are parliamentary democracies. Moving forward, it is likely that the United States and other Western and democratic powers will push for political reformation in autocratic nations or those with limited democratic features. Leaders must be smart and institute policies that will create situations that are conducive for the betterment of human life and opportunity. The responsibility is not only a moral imperative, where we are expected to help others if we can, but also the responsibility is inherent in the concepts of democracy where all are created equally. That is an imperative that applies across the globe, and leaders must be cognizant of how their policies impact lives, even in other nations for generations after their time in office.

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APPENDIX
FIGURE AND TABLES

Figure 1- Summary Statistics of Main Variables				
	Observations	Mean	Std. Deviation	Variance
Torture	437	0.764	0.8	0.635
Political Killings	438	0.479	0.721	0.52
Disappearances	438	0.281	0.606	0.367
Pol. Imprisonment	437	0.588	0.79	0.624
Amnesty International	592	2.076	1.183	1.4
State Department	592	1.745	1.035	1.07
Presidentialism	682	1.71	0.916	0.838
Non-Human Rights Sanctions	649	0.069	0.294	0.086

Table 1- Torture			
Ordered Probit	Model 1A Descriptive Model 1	Model 1B Descriptive Model 2	Model 1C Full Model
Presidentialism		0.438 *** (0.059)	0.196 *** (.075)
Sanction Severity		0.581 *** (0.195)	-0.68 (.846)
Civil War			0.845 *** (.223)
International War			0.152 (.429)
Sanction Duration			0.056 ** (.027)
Instability			-0.03 (.191)
Peace Years			0.006 (.006)
Riots			0.027 (.031)
GDP per capita			-0.488 *** (.063)
Population			0.214 *** (.049)
Recovery Period			0.426 (.414)
Presidentialism * Sanctions	0.222 *** (0.072)		0.171 (0.292)
<i>cutpoint 1</i>	-0.07	0.713	-0.172
<i>cutpoint 2</i>	0.789	1.655	1.188
Observations	437	437	434
Pseudo-R ²	0.0111	0.074	0.2805
Log-likelihood	-456.514	-427.448	-329.672

NOTE: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *** p < .01 ** p < .05 * p < .1

Table 2- Political Killings			
Ordered Probit	Model 2A Descriptive Model 1	Model 2B Descriptive Model 2	Model 2C Full Model
Presidentialism		0.602 *** (.065)	0.555 *** (.089)
Sanction Severity		0.741 *** (.195)	0.191 (.81)
Civil War			1.641 *** (.257)
International War			-0.42 (.425)
Sanction Duration			0.035 (.027)
Instability			-0.226 (.199)
Peace Years			0.000989 (.00699)
Riots			-0.036 (.026)
GDP per capita			-0.485 *** (.068)
Population			0.182 *** (.058)
Recovery Period			-0.038 (.42)
Presidentialism * Sanctions	0.291 *** (.072)		-0.118 (.281)
<i>cutpoint 1</i>	0.44	1.587	0.748
<i>cutpoint 2</i>	1.17	2.454	2.29
Observations	438	438	435
Pseudo-R ²	0.0232	0.1399	0.4439
Log-likelihood	-374.278	-329.546	-210.87

NOTE: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *** p < .01 ** p < .05 * p < .1

Table 3- Political Disappearances			
Ordered Probit	Model 3A Descriptive Model 1	Model 3B Descriptive Model 2	Model 3C Full Model
Presidentialism		0.68 *** (0.079)	0.833 *** (0.117)
Sanction Severity		0.424 ** (0.188)	-1.184 (1.088)
Civil War			0.856 *** (0.278)
International War			1.119 *** (0.434)
Sanction Duration			0.057 * (0.03)
Instability			-0.312 (0.219)
Peace Years			-0.03 *** (0.009)
Riots			-0.013 (0.029)
GDP per capita			-0.192 ** (0.076)
Population			-0.133 * (0.073)
Recovery Period			0.122 (0.454)
Presidentialism * Sanctions	0.226 *** (0.066)		0.225 (0.359)
<i>cutpoint 1</i>	0.892	2.276	-1.419
<i>cutpoint 2</i>	1.45	2.965	-0.362
Observations	438	438	435
Pseudo-R ²	0.0211	0.1649	0.3989
Log-likelihood	-271.502	-231.611	-164.937

NOTE: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *** p < .01 ** p < .05 * p < .1

Table 4- Political Imprisonment			
Ordered Probit	Model 4A Descriptive Model 1	Model 4B Descriptive Model 2	Model 4C Full Model
Presidentialism		0.319 *** (0.062)	0.068 (0.082)
Sanction Severity		1.8 *** (0.361)	-0.087 (1.346)
Civil War			1.21 *** (0.242)
International War			0.023 (0.449)
Sanction Duration			0.021 (0.028)
Instability			0.463 ** (0.206)
Peace Years			-0.006 (0.006)
Riots			0.029 (0.03)
GDP per capita			-0.306 *** (0.066)
Population			0.171 *** (0.055)
Recovery Period			0.44 (0.438)
Presidentialism * Sanctions	1.123 *** (0.3)		0.788 (0.942)
<i>cutpoint 1</i>	0.32	0.915	0.815
<i>cutpoint 2</i>	0.988	1.615	1.924
Observations	437	437	434
Pseudo-R ²	0.0527	0.0864	0.3509
Log-likelihood	-392.39	-378.424	-265.721

NOTE: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *** p < .01 ** p < .05 * p < .1

Table 5- Amnesty			
Ordered Probit	Model 5A Descriptive Model 1	Model 5B Descriptive Model 2	Model 5C Full Model
Presidentialism		0.594 *** (.05)	0.48 *** (.06)
Sanction Severity		0.673 *** (.145)	-0.208 (.471)
Civil War			1.215 *** (.191)
International War			-0.44 (.342)
Sanction Duration			0.044 ** (.02)
Instability			0.086 (.143)
Peace Years			-0.006 (.005)
Riots			-0.035 * (.02)
GDP per capita			-0.435 *** (.049)
Population			0.213 *** (.039)
Recovery Period			0.374 (.295)
Presidentialism * Sanctions	0.228 *** (.06)		-0.069 (.178)
<i>cutpoint 1</i>	-0.16	0.872	0.222
<i>cutpoint 2</i>	0.533	1.684	1.422
<i>cutpoint 3</i>	1.073	2.314	2.522
<i>cutpoint 4</i>	1.779	3.135	3.782
Observations	592	592	589
Pseudo-R ²	0.0087	0.0972	0.3085
Log-likelihood	-810.862	-738.468	-560.945

NOTE: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *** p < .01 ** p < .05 * p < .1

Table 6- State Department			
Ordered Probit	Model 6A Descriptive Model 1	Model 6B Descriptive Model 2	Model 6C Full Model
Presidentialism		0.586 *** (.053)	0.32 *** (.066)
Sanction Severity		0.896 *** (.152)	-1.799 *** (.521)
Civil War			1.316 *** (.202)
International War			0.336 (0.352)
Sanction Duration			0.072 *** (.021)
Instability			0.075 (.149)
Peace Years			0.000441 (.00556)
Riots			-0.07 *** (.022)
GDP per capita			-0.662 *** (.0563)
Population			0.217 *** (.0434)
Recovery Period			0.274 (.3)
Presidentialism * Sanctions	0.365 *** (0.064)		0.7 *** (.196)
<i>cutpoint 1</i>	0.225	1.31	-1.178
<i>cutpoint 2</i>	0.847	2.031	0.086
<i>cutpoint 3</i>	1.435	2.693	1.385
<i>cutpoint 4</i>	2.348	3.707	2.896
Observations	592	592	589
Pseudo-R ²	0.0241	0.1128	0.3996
Log-likelihood	-672.275	-611.14	-409.549

NOTE: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *** p < .01 ** p < .05 * p < .1

Table 7- Change in Probability of Repression When Moving from Parliamentary to Presidential Democracy				
Figure 1-		95% CI		
Torture	Mean	Standard Error	Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Low Levels	-0.15	0.056	-0.257	-0.037
Moderate Levels	0.064	0.025	0.017	0.116
Pervasive Levels	0.085	0.035	0.02	0.156
Figure 2-		95% CI		
Political Killings	Mean	Standard Error	Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Low Levels	-0.381	0.06	-0.5	-0.262
Moderate Levels	0.31	0.05	0.21	0.407
Pervasive Levels	0.071	0.022	0.036	0.12
Figure 3-		95% CI		
Disappearances	Mean	Standard Error	Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Low Levels	-0.293	0.051	-0.398	-0.199
Moderate Levels	0.232	0.04	0.157	0.315
Pervasive Levels	0.062	0.022	0.028	0.111
Figure 4-		95% CI		
Political Imprisonment	Mean	Standard Error	Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Low Levels	-0.053	0.062	-0.175	0.068
Moderate Levels	0.031	0.037	-0.043	0.102
Pervasive Levels	0.022	0.026	-0.027	0.077
Figure 5-		95% CI		
Amnesty International	Mean	Standard Error	Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Secure Rule of Law	-0.316	0.036	-0.387	-0.245
Limited Violations	0.011	0.021	-0.031	0.051
Extensive Violations	0.213	0.03	0.153	0.273
Near Systematic Violations	0.086	0.019	0.053	0.128
Systematic Violation	0.006	0.003	0.002	0.013
Figure 6-		95% CI		
State Department	Mean	Standard Error	Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Secure Rule of Law	-0.246	0.051	-0.345	-0.146
Limited Violations	0.153	0.032	0.091	0.216
Extensive Violations	0.085	0.022	0.046	0.132
Near Systematic Violations	0.007	0.003	0.002	0.016
Systematic Violation	0.00006	0.00008	0.000005	0.0003